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This study examined the development of social cognition in children with and without 
autism spectrum disorder (ASD), as well as the influence of behavioral and molecular genetics 
on these higher-order cognitive abilities.  Specifically, it was hypothesized that children with 
ASD would perform more poorly on all social cognitive tasks compared with typically 
developing peers.  In addition, it was hypothesized that typically developing children who 
performed better on a simpler social cognitive task at ages 3 or 4 would perform better at follow-
up (i.e., one time between the ages of 6-10).  Lastly, it was hypothesized that children who had at 
least one risk allele in both the DRD4 and the 5-HTTLPR polymorphisms would perform worse 
than those who had at least one risk allele in either polymorphism, who, in turn, would perform 
worse than children without any risk alleles.  The twin sample included 62 families of multiples 
(twins, triplets, or quadruplets) who were recruited through the Southern Illinois Twins and 
Siblings Study (SITSS), and the ASD sample included 25 children who were recruited from the 
Center for Autism Spectrum Disorders at SIU.  Significant group differences were found for 
children’s performance on all of the social cognitive tasks.  Furthermore, results showed that 
some areas of social cognition (theory of mind and the understanding of non-literal language) are 
more influenced by genetic factors than are other cognitive skills.  Lastly, results from the 
molecular genetic analyses suggest that basic social cognitive skills (e.g., theory of mind) may be 
influenced by underlying biological factors in the serotonergic and dopaminergic pathways.  The 
  
 
ii
present study provided useful information on how psychological and genetic factors influence 
the development of social cognitive abilities in children with and without ASD. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Social cognition involves a complex interplay of different abilities, drawing from social, 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral domains.  Understanding social cues, being able to take 
another's perspective, interpreting others' emotional displays, learning from prior social 
interactions, and applying that learning to future interactions are the necessary steps to a 
successful social exchange (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Crick & Dodge, 1994; Lemerise & Arsenio, 
2000).  Theory of mind (ToM) tasks, which measure the ability to infer others’ mental states, are 
commonly used to study social cognition in children (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
Recently, Peterson, Wellman, and Slaughter (2012) validated the addition of a new step to the 
well-established preschool ToM Scale created by Wellman and Liu (2004).  This new step 
extends developmental milestones to include an understanding of nonliteral language such as 
sarcasm in slightly older children (i.e., school-age).  Limited research using this newly validated 
ToM Scale exists; therefore, this study added to the literature in this area.  In addition, the Social 
Responsiveness Scale, 2nd Edition (SRS-2; Constantino & Gruber, 2012), a newly released 
edition that includes a social cognition treatment subscale, was used in this study.  The study 
used both a longitudinal and a cross-sectional design and included typically developing twins, as 
well as children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD).   
The first goal of this study was to better understand the development of social cognition 
in typically developing children.  This was done by using data previously collected from twin 
pairs who participated in the Southern Illinois Twins and Siblings Study (SITSS; DiLalla, 
2002a).  To assess longitudinal progression in the acquisition of ToM skills, 6- to 10-year-old 
twins were administered five ToM measures in the follow-up portion of this study.  Data 
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collected from the ToM tasks at ages three and four was used to predict current performance on 
the ToM tasks in this study.  
The second goal of this study was to compare the social cognitive abilities of typically 
developing twins to those of children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), who historically 
have performed poorly on measures of ToM (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  Therefore, 
children between the ages of 6 and 10 who have been diagnosed with ASD were administered 
the same five measures of ToM as the ones administered to the twins.  Given that group 
differences emerged when comparing the performance of children with ASD to typically 
developing children, this provides further support for the idea that children with ASD have 
impairments in social cognitive abilities.       
The third goal of this study attempted to shed light on the relation between genetic 
influence and the development of social behaviors in young children with and without social 
impairment.  Several recent studies have shown that social cognition may be related to genetic 
variations in the dopamine and/or serotonin systems (Lackner, Bowman, & Sabbagh, 2010; 
Lackner, Sabbagh, Hallinan, Liu, & Holden, 2012; Skuse & Gallagher, 2011).  Thus, the 
neurotransmitters dopamine and serotonin were selected for this study because of their 
implication in the development of social cognitive abilities (Rogers, 2011; Skuse & Gallagher, 
2011).  More specifically, the rewards associated with experiencing social interactions are related 
to the dopamine system, whereas the emotional experience of social interaction is associated 
with serotonin.  Therefore, this study examined how dopaminergic and serotonergic risk alleles 
(i.e., DRD4 and 5-HTTLPR, respectively) were related to social behaviors such as ToM.   
Overall, this study aimed to advance knowledge of the psychological and genetic 
contributions to the development of social cognition in both typically and atypically developing 
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samples of children.  Research such as this is needed to better understand the complexities of 
social interactions and the ability to take another person’s perspective, especially when someone 
else's beliefs are different from one's own.  This study has potential to be useful clinically in 
terms of better understanding a potential source of difficulty that school-aged children may be 
having in peer relationships (i.e., inability to take another’s perspective).  Lastly, the inclusion of 
a clinical comparison group allowed for the investigation of group differences in ToM task 
performance, which could inform development of social cognitive curricula used in school- and 
community-based interventions.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Social Cognition 
The development of social cognition in children has been a rapidly expanding area of 
interest over the past few decades.  The understanding of this higher-order ability warrants 
attention given the fact that humans spend a significant amount of time in social relationships 
with others (Astington, 1993).  Despite the popularity of the topic, researchers disagree on 
fundamental aspects of its definition such as when this ability emerges in children.  A growing 
body of literature supports the idea that children as young as infants have the ability to navigate 
social situations by using social cues (Rakoczy, 2012; Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2012).  For 
example, an infant who is startled by a barking dog for the first time may look to her parent to 
see if the dog is “safe” by referencing her parent’s facial expression (e.g., a smile or a fearful 
face).  Assessing social cognitive abilities is difficult in young children given their limited verbal 
abilities.  Much of the previous research in this area has focused on precursors, or building 
blocks, of social cognition in younger children, which include engaging in joint attention, 
understanding the “intentionality” of actions, recognizing that others have different perspectives, 
and using imagination in play (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Miller, 2006).  
Social cognition goes beyond perspective taking, however, because it is a heterogeneous 
term that encompasses literature from social psychology (e.g., schemas, attributions, stereotypes) 
and cognitive psychology (e.g., reasoning, attention, memory; Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  
Perspective taking, on the other hand, is defined as a construct that can be assessed only by 
behavioral means, but it does not account for the contributions from cognitive and emotional 
states.  Furthermore, social cognition can be defined as the ability to understand others’ attitudes, 
beliefs, values, desires, and social knowledge (Astington, 1993).  It also can refer to aspects of 
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higher cognitive functioning that allow for the understanding of “one’s own and others’ minds” 
(Baron-Cohen, 2000).  Although most children develop the skills needed for navigating the 
social world as they progress through childhood and adolescence, some children and adolescents 
have more difficulty than others.  For example, children and adolescents with externalizing 
disorders such as conduct disorder, especially those with comorbid aggressive features, are often 
impaired in social cognitive abilities (Lochman & Dodge, 1994).  These children are believed to 
have difficulty processing social information when interacting with others.  In addition, children 
with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are also impaired in social cognitive functioning.  In fact, 
Baron-Cohen (2000) argued that all individuals with ASD have deficits in social cognition, 
suggesting that it may be a hallmark characteristic of the disorder.  Individuals who have 
difficulty navigating social situations such as children with conduct disorder or ASD have a wide 
variety of social impairments, ranging from mild to severe.   It is believed that these individuals 
are impaired in their ability to follow the necessary steps to reach the appropriate behavioral 
outcome when processing social cues or other social information.  
Social Information Processing Theory   
Social Information Processing Theory (Crick & Dodge, 1994) is a well-known model that 
was modified from an original model by Dodge (1986).  This theory states that people enter into 
social relationships with prior knowledge of how to navigate new social situations based on their 
previous experiences.  According to Crick and Dodge, people typically rely on past memories, 
schemas, and social scripts in order to dictate their future behavior.  Furthermore, individuals 
placed in novel social situations are believed to process social information in a systematic way 
through a series of processing steps.  These processing steps include: 1) encoding of external and 
internal cues; 2) interpretation of those cues; 3) selection of goals; 4) mental access to possible 
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behavioral responses; 5) selection of a particular response; and 6) behavioral enactment of 
selected response.  Crick and Dodge suggested that social information processing through the use 
of these six steps is not linear.  Furthermore, they believe each step can interact with the others, 
and the social information processing is subject to feedback at any step along the way. 
During a novel social interaction, a child is processing the first two steps: encoding and 
interpreting cues.  The memory of past experiences is very important to these initial steps 
because a child often remembers previous social interactions that may not have gone well.  A 
child’s own internal cues that he is the target of bullying yet again will send feedback to his 
social processing system.  For example, a child who is frequently teased by other peers is likely 
to view a more neutral situation as negative and hostile rather than accidental.  This attribution 
will have a direct effect on the third step, or the generation of possible goals.  Given that the 
child may be feeling defensive from being bullied, his first choice for a goal may be to get back 
at the other child who teased him.  The fourth step, response access, describes an individual’s 
ability to think back through their responses to similar past experiences for ways to deal with the 
current situation.  If a child is most likely to retaliate in an aggressive manner when provoked, 
then aggressive options are most likely to come to mind in the new social situation.  During the 
fifth step, response decision, a child selects his/her response of choice from among the possible 
options.  Crick and Dodge noted that concepts related to social psychology such as self-efficacy, 
expectations, and morals are taken into consideration at this stage.  For example, if a child is 
more confident that a particular solution is going to work, then she might be more likely to 
choose that option in this step.  In addition, a child is more likely to select an option not only if 
he believes it is going to solve the problem, but also if the solution aligns with his moral views 
(e.g., believing it is okay to steal from another person).  Lastly, the sixth step, behavioral 
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enactment, is the act of going through with the selected choice from the previous step.  Crick and 
Dodge emphasize in the social information processing model that multiple factors are taken into 
account when choosing the final decision. 
 More recently, Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) have outlined some additions to the theory 
initially proposed by Crick and Dodge (1994).  The most notable contribution was the addition of 
emotional processing as a factor in each of the steps outlined by Crick and Dodge.  Lemerise and 
Arsenio argued that each person brings a unique emotional response style, arousal level, and 
mood to social interactions.  When interacting with others in a social manner, both individuals’ 
emotional states were important factors in determining the eventual quality of the interaction.  If 
one person was overly emotional, this behavior was likely to influence the goal selected and 
subsequent actions of the other. 
 In summary, individuals who have difficulty navigating social interactions with others, 
such as those who diagnosed with conduct disorder or autism spectrum disorder (ASD), are 
believed to have social information processing deficits.  Crick and Dodge (1994) outlined six 
steps necessary for processing social cues (i.e., cues taken from others and one's own internal 
experiences) that lead to an actual or predictable behavior.  Lemerise and Arsenio (2000) 
modified Crick and Dodge’s model by adding an emotional component to each step outlined in 
the Social Information Processing Theory.  Both sets of researchers describe the interaction of 
the steps within the models and the importance of feedback at each stage.  Thus, successful 
social interactions require the integration of social, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral aspects, 
learning from prior social experiences, and the ability to take another's perspective, also known 
as Theory of Mind, which will be discussed next.  
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Theory of mind (ToM)   
Social cognition is a broad construct that is comprised of social and cognitive 
components.  The development of theory of mind (ToM) is an example of one such social-
cognitive skill necessary for attaining social competence.  Having a true understanding of ToM 
implies that an individual recognizes that one can never fully understand another’s mind; 
however, one can assume that others also think and reason because they themselves are able to 
do the same.  Wellman and Liu (2004) used the term “mental subjectivity” to describe the ability 
to understand another’s mental state as a response to objective events or observable behaviors.  
Furthermore, ToM is defined as the ability to understand how human behavior is dictated by 
mental states of actual and false beliefs, the intentions of self and others, memory of past 
experiences, and desire to perform specific behavioral responses (Peterson et al., 2012).  This 
social knowledge allows individuals to explain and predict the behavior of those with whom they 
are interacting (Wellman & Estes, 1986). 
Given that children, especially pre-verbal infants, do not have the capacity to understand 
another’s perspective at an adult-like level, research has focused on the developmental changes 
of ToM in young children.  Many researchers have shown that the preschool years between three 
and five years of age are when most children rapidly develop the ability to complete ToM tasks 
(de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Wellman et al., 2001; 
Youngblade & Dunn, 1995).  Some researchers have argued that children as young as two years 
old may be able to begin to understand what others want, see, and feel, albeit at a simple level 
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman, Phillips, & Rodriguez, 2000).  By the age of three, young 
children are able to tell the difference between what others are thinking and what others are 
doing and from that age on can distinguish between objectivity and subjectivity (Flavell, Flavell, 
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Green, & Moses, 1990; Watson, Gelman, & Wellman, 1998; Wellman & Estes, 1986).  One 
study by Flavell, Green, and Flavell (1995) showed that children who are between three and five 
years of age begin to differentiate between thinking (i.e., mental states) and doing (i.e., 
behavior).  Children begin to comprehend that by understanding another’s mental state, it is 
easier to justify why someone chooses to act in a certain way (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000).   
The focus of most research on the development of ToM in children between the ages of 
three and five has concerned false beliefs.  False belief tasks are designed such that a child is 
asked to explain or predict a situation from another’s perspective regarding a belief that does not 
match reality.  For example, a child is shown a container and asked what is inside without having 
seen the contents.  When shown that the contents do not match the container in which the items 
were kept, the child is then asked what another person who has not seen the inside would say is 
in the container.  Perner and Wimmer (1985) outlined two different types of false belief 
attributions: first-order and second-order.  First-order belief attributions involve Person A 
making a judgment about Person B’s belief related to an event that occurred or an object that was 
shown to Person A but not to Person B.  For example, if Person A is asked what is behind a 
cupboard door without having seen inside, Person A likely will give a practical response such as 
“dishes.”  Person A is shown a shoe in the cupboard (i.e., an unexpected response), and then 
asked what his friend might say is in the cupboard.  A child who understands first-order beliefs 
would say that Person B thinks there are dishes in the cupboard when Person A now knows that 
there is a shoe in the cupboard.  A second-order belief attribution involves attributing a belief to 
one person about another person’s beliefs.  An example of this is a child saying, “Jimmy thinks 
that Mary thinks that…” This more advanced second-order attribution ability is believed to be 
present by the age of seven in typically developing children (Perner & Wimmer, 1985).  Many 
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children who are three years of age fail false belief tasks; however, by four to five years of age, 
most typically developing children are able to pass false belief tasks (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & 
Flavell, 1981; Wellman et al., 2001).  
Implicit/indirect versus explicit/direct tasks   
Research on ToM tasks can be divided into two categories: implicit/indirect tasks and 
explicit/direct tasks (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Low & Perner, 2012).  Studies differentiating 
between indirect and direct tasks attempt to answer the question of whether a young child under 
the age of three is unable to complete ToM tasks due to developmental constraints or if the 
method used to measure ToM is hindering their ability to answer correctly.  As a way to 
eliminate the language demands of ToM tasks, several studies using infants have used 
implicit/indirect tasks such as an anticipatory looking task to measure the development of ToM.  
During one type of anticipatory looking task first used by Clements and Perner (1994), infants 
were trained to watch a hand move in a predictable pattern to grab one of two objects on opposite 
sides of a small platform.  After the infants were habituated to this behavior, the two objects 
were switched and the hand either reached for the same object in the opposite location or a new 
object in the old location.  The infants tended to look longer at the new object along the same 
path as before than at the new path with the old object in its new location.  This suggests that 
infants are surprised about the new event that occurred, but this does not necessarily support the 
fact that infants understand others’ mental states.  Evidence for an earlier understanding of ToM 
has been show in infants as young as 18 months old (Neumann, Thoermer, & Sodian, 2008) and 
25 months old (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007); however, Sodian (2011) argued that these 
studies may not be measuring the same cognitive ability as the ToM tasks administered to verbal 
children through the use of explicit/direct tasks.  Implicit/indirect tasks have the benefit of being 
  
 
11
a more efficient and developmentally appropriate way to measure ToM in infants compared with 
explicit/direct tasks; however, the former are less cognitively demanding and more inflexible 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).   
The second type of task, explicit/direct tasks, is more cognitively demanding but more 
flexible.  False belief tasks are direct measures of ToM because they elicit verbal responses from 
the child who is performing the task.  Rather than implying the belief indirectly through a 
nonverbal anticipatory looking task with infants, explicit/direct tasks can be answered directly 
using open-ended questions.  An example of this type of task is the cupboard example that was 
previously described.  Explicit/direct tasks were the type of task used in this study because the 
children with and without autism spectrum disorder had the language ability necessary to 
respond verbally to ToM items. 
 Recent research by Wellman & Liu (2004) has suggested that ToM may not be an 
isolated skill, but rather children may progress through a series of skills related to ToM.  Support 
for this progression comes from a preliminary meta-analysis by Wellman and Liu (2004) and 
prior work by other researchers (Astington, 2001; Flavell & Miller, 1998; Repacholi & Gopnik, 
1997; Wellman & Woolley, 1990). Results from the meta-analysis showed that children are able 
to accurately judge another person's desires (i.e., whether people want a particular object or not) 
prior to being able to accurately judge another person's beliefs (i.e., people’s subjective thoughts 
about an objective event).  Furthermore, Wellman & Liu (2004) reported that children were able 
to successfully perform belief tasks that do not involve deception before being able to pass false 
belief tasks.  Interestingly, children are even able to indicate that someone else might not know 
what is in a container before reporting that another person falsely believes a particular object is 
in the container.  Although the authors indicated that the meta-analysis results were preliminary, 
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there was significant evidence to support the claim that ToM develops in a progressive manner, 
which is consistent with social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1989).  Follow-up studies from the 
same researchers have also supported this progression (Peterson et al., 2012; Wellman, Fang, & 
Peterson, 2011). 
Developmental progression of theory of mind   
The second part of the study by Wellman & Liu (2004) tested the differences in abilities 
based on the results from the preliminary meta-analysis and results from previous studies 
suggesting that the skills may develop in a linear fashion.  The results of the second part of the 
study provided psychometric support for a 5-step model of progressive ToM skills.  Performance 
on ToM tasks in a sample of 75 children between three and five years of age were analyzed using 
a Guttman (1944, 1950) scale, which is a measure of how actual item responses fit an ideal 
pattern.  The results revealed that 80% of children (i.e., 60 out of 75) had a similar progression of 
skill acquisition.  More specifically, children were able to pass the following tasks in sequential 
order: diverse desire (understanding that people express differing desires for the same object), 
diverse belief (understanding that people have different beliefs about the same objective event), 
knowledge access (understanding that someone may be unaware of a certain fact), contents false 
belief (understanding that, despite a certain fact, someone might believe something differently), 
and lastly real-apparent emotion (understanding that someone can show a different emotion than 
the one they are feeling).  One drawback to the Guttman scaling is that if two items are similar, 
one item is excluded because it is believed to be representing a similar, or redundant, construct.  
The Guttman scale in the Wellman & Liu (2004) study excluded two items: explicit false belief 
and belief-emotion.  Although these items were excluded from the Guttman scale, that does not 
necessarily mean they are not important in the development of ToM abilities.  Therefore, these 
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tasks were included in the present study, especially in light of the importance of emotion in 
social information processing as previously discussed (Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000).  Given that 
all children over the age of four are presumed to be able to pass the diverse desire and diverse 
belief tasks, those were not administered as part of this study.   
 In addition to the four remaining tasks (i.e., contents false belief, explicit false belief, 
belief emotion, and real-apparent emotion) outlined by Wellman & Liu (2004), an additional task 
was added to tap the understanding of non-literal language (i.e., irony, sarcasm) in this study 
given that the children in this study were 6- to 10-year-olds.  Peterson et al. (2012) argued for the 
addition of a more advanced ToM task for school-age children given that most children will have 
successfully mastered the understanding of false belief tasks by the age of five.  In the study by 
Peterson et al. (2012), 184 children aged 3-12, who were typically developing, deaf, or had 
autism or Asperger syndrome, completed Wellman & Liu's (2004) 5-step ToM tasks with the 
addition of a new step tapping sarcasm.  The results indicated that children with autism or 
Asperger syndrome were not only delayed in their ability to acquire ToM, but their pattern of 
abilities was different than the other groups.  More specifically, these children were more likely 
to pass the hidden emotion (i.e., real-apparent emotion) task before the false belief task.  This 
suggests that children with autism may not only be delayed in developing social cognitive skills 
in general, but they also may exhibit an atypical pattern of acquiring the ability to understand 
others’ mental states compared to typically developing children.  In contrast, the typically 
developing children progressed on schedule through the items in the predicted pattern previously 
outlined.  Moreover, the deaf children were delayed in their abilities, but they had the same 
pattern as the typically developing children.  Thus, children with autism and children who were 
deaf had delays compared with typically developing children on the new scale even after 
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controlling for age and language ability.  Peterson and colleagues showed that the additional 
ToM step (i.e., understanding non-literal language such as sarcasm) was a reliable and valid 
addition to the previous ToM Scale outlined by Wellman & Liu (2004).  The authors added that 
the inclusion of this step allows for an increase in the age range of children in future studies of 
the developmental progression of social cognitive abilities. 
 In conclusion, a substantial amount of research in the past has focused on the ability of 
children to successfully complete explicit/direct ToM tasks such as false belief tasks.  However, 
a recent review by Wellman (2002) argues that ToM is comprised of several different sequential 
components that build on and interact with one another.  A 5-step ToM Scale was developed by 
Wellman & Liu (2004) and was recently extended by adding a sixth step, which assesses the 
ability to understand non-literal language (Peterson et al., 2012).  Typically developing and deaf 
children appear to follow a predictable pattern, with each successive step building on the 
previous one.  Children with ASD are not only delayed in their ability to perform these tasks, 
they also complete the tasks in a somewhat different order (i.e., understanding hidden emotion 
tasks before false belief tasks).  Thus, studies on the atypical development of ToM abilities 
should include children with autism spectrum disorder.  
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a severe, pervasive, and complex 
neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by impairments in social-emotional functioning and 
communication abilities and the presence of restricted, repetitive, or stereotyped interests and 
behaviors (APA, 2000).  Common social impairments include a lack of reciprocal social 
interaction, poor eye contact, and difficulty engaging in joint attention.  Communication deficits 
can include failure to develop verbal communication, use of echolalia (i.e., repeating others’ 
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speech or lines from television shows or movies), verbal rituals (i.e., requiring others to say 
phrases in certain ways), and difficulty initiating or maintaining conversations with others.   
A modification to the current diagnostic criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition (DSM-5; APA, 2013) included lumping the social and 
communication symptoms into one domain.  Impairments such as difficulty understanding non-
verbal communication (e.g., reading facial expressions, understanding the prosody of speech) 
and difficulty engaging in reciprocal social interactions may be better described as difficulties in 
social-communication abilities rather than fitting neatly into one category or the other.  In 
addition to social-communication deficits, many children with ASD exhibit a restricted, 
repetitive, or stereotyped pattern of behavior or interests.  For some children, a restricted interest 
may manifest in an intense preoccupation with particular objects (e.g., trains, wheels on a toy 
car) or topic (e.g., knowledge of dinosaurs, transportation schedules, makes and models of cars).  
Other common restricted behaviors include a rigid insistence on sameness in daily routine (e.g., 
requiring a parent to drive a certain way to school or to the grocery store) or in the organization 
of household items (e.g., lining up toys, insisting that canned food labels all face in the same 
direction).  Children who engage in repetitive behaviors (e.g., opening and closing a door) often 
become upset when told to stop performing the repetitive action.  Commonly reported 
stereotyped behaviors include spinning, rocking, or hand flapping. 
As previously noted in DSM-IV (APA, 2000), children with Autistic Disorder were 
considered to be more impaired (e.g., exhibiting limited language functioning or being 
nonverbal) than children with Pervasive Developmental Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified 
(PDD-NOS) or Asperger syndrome.  At present, the diagnostic criterion no longer distinguishes 
between children who did or did not have delayed language acquisition (previously a 
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requirement to meet the diagnostic criteria for Asperger syndrome).  These children tended to be 
known as “higher functioning” and typically attended the regular education classroom, whereas 
children with Autistic Disorder were commonly placed in special education.  Children with 
PDD-NOS were typically in mainstream classrooms, depending on their level of functioning, but 
some may have been in special education for part of the day, such as for academic subjects, and 
with typically developing peers for special subjects (e.g., physical education, art, music).  
Presently, the “spectrum” modifier in the new diagnostic category “Autism Spectrum Disorder” 
allows for the inclusion of children with a range of abilities across the areas of social-
communication and restricted and repetitive behaviors.  Currently, individuals meeting criteria 
for ASD must show impairments in social-communication abilities, as well as the presence of 
restricted and repetitive behaviors.  If a child does not present with restricted and repetitive 
behaviors but does exhibit age-inappropriate levels of social-communication abilities, the child 
meets criteria for Social Communication Disorder, a new disorder included in DSM-5.   
Gold standard diagnostic practices recommend that if a young child fails a screening test, 
a trained professional (e.g., a psychologist) should administer a battery of follow-up tests, which 
includes the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994) 
and the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, Goode, Heemsbergen, 
Jordan, Mawhood, & Schopler, 1989).  Recent research has shown that children with ASD can 
be reliably differentiated from children without ASD and from children with mental retardation 
at 12 months of age (Osterling, Dawson, & Munson, 2002).  This suggests that early 
identification is possible, which is important for parents and healthcare professionals to know, 
especially in light of the fact that early intensive behavioral intervention often is effective at 
improving several areas of functioning such as IQ, adaptive behavior, personality, and school 
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placement (i.e., advancing from special education to the regular education classroom; Eldevik, 
Hastings, Hughes, Jahr, Eikeseth, & Cross, 2009).  In fact, timing is so important, that the earlier 
that children begin receiving intensive services, the better off they are at follow-up in terms of 
outcomes across a range of domains (i.e., cognitive, social, and adaptive functioning), with some 
potentially becoming indistinguishable from peers by middle school (Helt et al., 2008). 
Autism prevalence rates.  Current estimates of autism prevalence are as high as one in 
every 88 children, according to a recent report by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC, 2012).  A prior report in 2009 by the CDC estimated that 1 in 110 children between the 
ages of three and 10 met criteria for ASD.  The report indicated that there has been a 78% 
increase over the past five years and a 10-fold increase over the past decade.  There is significant 
debate over the reasons for the increase in prevalence rate in recent years.  One of the commonly 
agreed up reasons for the increase is the direct result of broadening the diagnostic criteria to 
include a "spectrum" of social behaviors, communication abilities, and restricted or repetitive 
interests/behaviors.  By expanding the diagnosis to include children with impairments of a lesser 
severity than children with Autistic Disorder, many more children began receiving diagnoses of 
PDD-NOS and Asperger syndrome.  In addition, screening measures and diagnostic practices 
were improving such that children who were being “missed” in the past were no longer being 
overlooked when given the gold standard diagnostic test battery including the ADI-R and ADOS, 
as well as a cognitive ability measure to estimate intellectual functioning.   
An additional reason for the increase came to light following a study done in California 
by researchers at Columbia University that showed that children previously meeting criteria for 
intellectual disability (i.e., mental retardation) in the past were increasingly being more 
accurately diagnosed with ASD (King & Bearman, 2009).  This change alone was estimated to 
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account for 26% of the increased number of cases.  Another factor includes the increased 
awareness of the disorder among parents, healthcare professionals, and educators.  Better 
dissemination of knowledge of the characteristics of the disorder, typically among parents, was 
estimated to increase the number of diagnoses by 16% (Liu, King, & Bearman, 2010).   
Another 11% of the reported increase in ASD prevalence was attributed to social factors 
such as advanced parental age, specifically that of the mother.  This finding is not unusual given 
that other studies have shown that advanced parental age is associated with other developmental 
disorders such as mental retardation.  Grether, Anderson, Croen, Smith, and Windham (2009) 
reported that a 10-year increase in the age of the mother, especially for woman over the age of 
40, dramatically increased their risk of having a child with ASD by 38% (Liu, Zerubavel, & 
Bearman, 2010).  The mechanism behind the increase in rates of ASD in older parents is 
currently unknown, but it is the focus of several studies in progress such as the Early Autism 
Risk Longitudinal Investigation, which is funded by the National Institutes of Health and Autism 
Speaks. 
In terms of etiology, autism spectrum disorder is believed to be the most highly heritable 
neurodevelopmental disorder in children (APA, 2000).  The strong genetic influence in ASD has 
been documented in many twin and family studies (see Folstein & Rosen-Sheidley, 2001, for 
review).  Heritability estimates as high as 60–70% have been reported in the literature (Veenstra-
VanDer-Weele et al., 2004).  Furthermore, Hallmayer and colleagues (2011) reported results 
from a study of 192 twin pairs (54 monozygotic [MZ], or identical, twins and 138 dizygotic 
[DZ], or fraternal, twins) of which at least one twin was diagnosed with ASD.  Concordance 
rates for MZ twins ranged from 50% to 71% for male and female twin pairs, respectively, 
whereas concordance rates for DZ twins ranged from 31% to 36% for male-male and female-
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female twin pairs, respectively.  Another twin study by Rosenberg et al. (2009) also reported 
higher concordance rates for MZ twins (88%) versus DZ twins (31%) across the autism spectrum.  
This study included 277 twin pairs (67 MZ twins and 210 DZ twins) with at least one twin with 
autism spectrum disorder.  Rosenberg and colleagues (2009) investigated not only the 
concordance rates of MZ and DZ twins, but also the concordance rates when taking comorbid 
conditions into consideration.  More specifically, DZ twins were significantly more discordant 
on overall loss of skills, and there was a trend toward DZ twins being more discordant on 
intellectual disability (i.e., by parent report or by documented IQ), timing of achieving 
developmental milestones, and early loss of social skills compared with MZ twins.   
Although ASD is believed to be highly heritable, environmental influences cannot be 
ruled out.  Not surprisingly, environmental factors have been the subject of several recent studies 
of children with autism spectrum disorder (Hallmayer et al., 2011).  A recent meta-analysis of 40 
studies by Gardener, Spiegelman, and Buka (2011) reported that children were at higher risk for 
ASD if there were perinatal or birth complications (e.g., low birth weight, multiple births, 
maternal infection during pregnancy).  The authors of the meta-analysis concluded that there was 
not enough information to indicate that one risk factor alone is responsible for an increased risk 
of developing ASD.  Rather, it is likely the interaction of multiple perinatal factors that may be 
responsible for the elevated risk. 
In summary, children with ASD are impaired in social and communication abilities and 
are characterized by restricted, repetitive, or stereotyped patterns of behavior and interests (APA, 
2013).  Prevalence estimates for this neurodevelopmental disorder have been reported to be as 
high as 1:88 children, according to the most recent report by the CDC (2012).  Several factors 
have been identified as contributing factors (e.g., increased parent and clinician awareness, 
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broadening of the definition, advanced parental age), but these factors alone do not explain the 
600% increase in rates over the past decade.  ASD is a highly heritable disorder, as shown by the 
high concordance rates between monozygotic (MZ) twins versus dizygotic (DZ) twins.  
However, genetics alone do not account for the high rates of the disorder, suggesting that 
environmental influences also are likely at play.  A recent meta-analysis of perinatal factors 
suggested that birth complications might be contributing to the increased rates of the disorder; 
however, no single factor was isolated as being sufficient for the disorder (Gardener et al., 2011). 
The Relation Between Autism Spectrum Disorder and Theory of Mind 
 Impairments in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) go beyond social 
difficulties (e.g., difficulty starting or maintaining a conversation with a peer) to include 
cognitive components as well (e.g., difficulty understanding others' mental states).  Deficits in 
social cognition in children with ASD have been routinely reported in the literature using theory 
of mind (ToM) tasks.  In a review of the relation between ToM abilities and autism by Baron-
Cohen (2000), the author noted that several studies have shown that children with autism had 
difficulties understanding others' mental states when compared with typically developing peers 
with comparable mental ages.  During these tasks, children with autism reported what they 
believed was true rather than indicating what another person might be thinking (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Perner, Frith, Leslie & Leekam, 1989; Reed & Peterson, 
1990; Swettenham, 1996; Swettenham, Baron-Cohen, Gomez & Walsh, 1996).  One explanation 
for the difference in ToM performance between typically developing children and children with 
ASD may be that children with ASD lack the understanding of where the knowledge needed to 
explain a given situation comes from.  For example, Pratt and Bryant (1990) tested three- and 
four-year-olds on a "seeing leads to knowing" task to determine the plausibility of an event 
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occurring based on knowledge differences (i.e., having or lacking information).  More 
specifically, this study showed that typically developing three- and four-year-old children easily 
understood that if a person was allowed to look inside a box, then that person would have 
knowledge of its contents; however, if the same person was not allowed to look inside the box, 
they would be unaware of its contents.  In contrast, Baron-Cohen and Goodhart (1994) showed 
that children with autism responded at the level of chance when completing this task, which 
suggested that they did not understand the concept of “seeing leads to knowing” (i.e., that the 
person who was able to look inside the box would know the contents of the box).  
 Children with ASD also have difficulty performing other cognitive and emotional tasks 
related to the understanding of mental states when compared with typically developing peers.  
For example, a study by Tager-Flusberg (1992) showed that children with autism used fewer 
words than controls to describe the functions of the brain such as "thinking," "knowing," 
"hoping," and "imagining" and instead used more action words than controls such as "jump," 
"eat," or "move" when describing a picture by telling a story.  The action word descriptions in 
this study can be thought of as being more literal, whereas the brain functions are more abstract.  
When investigating the emotional understanding of children with ASD, Harris, Johnson, Hutton, 
Andrews, and Cooke (1989) reported that typically developing children aged four to six were 
able to understand that emotions can be caused by internal thoughts and beliefs rather than by 
actions.  For example, a child can be excited by the prospect of getting a toy that he was 
promised when he successfully completes his homework.  In contrast, children with ASD have 
difficulty with this type of abstract emotional understanding (Baron-Cohen, Spitz, & Cross, 
1993).  In this study, children with ASD were able to understand more basic emotions such as 
happy and sad that are the result of actions; however, they had difficulty understanding emotions 
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such as surprise, which are related to more advanced cognitions and which are the result of 
beliefs rather than actions.  Interestingly, children with intellectual disability did not differ from 
typically developing children in their ability to recognize any of the three emotions (i.e., happy, 
sad, or surprise), which suggests that this impairment may be unique to autism and not due to 
overall cognitive ability.  Overall, this implies that children with ASD have difficulty 
understanding emotions when there is a more advanced underlying cognitive component 
involved (Baron-Cohen et al., 1993).   
 In addition to basic social cognitive impairments such as emotion recognition, children 
with ASD are impaired in their ability to comprehend higher-order cognitive demands such as 
understanding pragmatics, or the social use of language (APA, 2000; Baron-Cohen, 2000; 
Peterson et al., 2012).  In this population, difficulties with pragmatic language such as 
understanding prosody are apparent in a social context even at a young age, and therefore can be 
used to measure higher-order social cognitive abilities in children with ASD.  These children 
frequently have trouble taking turns in a conversation, staying on topic, smoothly transitioning to 
a new conversational topic, and understanding what is appropriate to say in a given context.  In 
addition, children with ASD often have difficulty understanding humor, sarcasm, or irony 
because the content of the spoken words (i.e., a more literal understanding) does not match the 
intended meaning (i.e., more abstract social communication).  Furthermore, the additional 
demands of understanding nonverbal communication when interacting with others such as 
reading body language proves challenging for many children on the autism spectrum.  Several 
studies have provided support for the idea that this is a common area of weakness in children 
with ASD (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted, 1999; Surian, Baron-Cohen & 
Van der Lely, 1996).  In these studies children with ASD were unable to choose which responses 
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would not be appropriate to a given question or if there were certain comments that someone 
made in a short story that he or she should not have said.  Results from these studies support the 
idea that these children have difficulty understanding the pragmatics of language, a proxy of the 
understanding of higher-order cognitive abilities in social context, which included understanding 
what is appropriate to say in a given situation. 
 The debate over ToM impairments in ASD.  The debate over Baron-Cohen’s (2000) 
claim that all children with ASD exhibit impairments in the understanding of theory of mind 
deserves some additional attention.  Researchers who have argued that not all children with ASD 
exhibit these challenges often have pointed to the fact that many children with ASD, especially 
higher functioning children with Asperger syndrome, can pass first-order false belief tasks (i.e., 
understanding that another person has a different belief).  Happé (1995) attempted to clarify this 
argument by noting that many children with ASD can eventually pass first-order false belief 
tasks, but this is often not accomplished until much later than typically developing children (i.e., 
nine years old versus four years old), with the earliest reported age of successful completion of 
this type of task being five-and-a-half years old.  Given this information, the debate then turned 
to the ability of children with ASD to pass second-order false belief tasks (e.g., Tom thinks that 
Sally thinks that…).  These tasks are often understood by typically developing children around 
the age of six (Happé, 1995).  Much like the first-order debate, researchers have shown that some 
higher functioning individuals with autism or Asperger syndrome can complete these tasks by 
the teenage years (Bowler, 1992; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991).  Currently, many 
researchers agree that these abilities (i.e., passing first- and second-order false belief tasks) can 
be acquired, albeit at a delayed rate, by adolescence (Peterson et al., 2012; Wellman & Liu, 
2004).  Therefore, much of the most recent research on theory of mind understanding and autism 
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spectrum disorder has focused on the understanding of higher-order cognitive processes such as 
the understanding of the pragmatics of language given that only a few studies have investigated 
this area of social cognition in ASD.  The present study attempted to add to the growing 
literature in this area. 
In summary, children with ASD exhibit a variety of deficits in social cognition, ranging 
from the more basic understanding that others may have beliefs that are different from one’s own 
to more the more advanced understanding of the social use of language such as pragmatics.  
These difficulties, evidenced by poor performance on cognitive measures such as theory of mind 
tasks, have been reported consistently in the literature (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, 
2000).  Even children who are "higher functioning" in certain areas (e.g., communication or 
adaptive functioning abilities) still exhibit impairments in social cognition, especially when 
emotions are involved.  This suggests that this cluster of abilities may be deficient in many, if not 
all, children with ASD.  Furthermore, impairments in social-emotional functioning can have 
detrimental effects on the social competence of children with ASD (Sigman & Ruskin, 1999; 
Tager-Flusberg, 2000). 
Lastly, as previously mentioned, autism spectrum disorder is a highly heritable 
neurodevelopmental disorder, as noted by the high concordance rates in MZ twins compared 
with DZ twins (APA, 2000).  Given that impairments in social cognition, specifically the 
understanding of theory of mind (ToM), are common to many, if not all, children with ASD, 
there might be a genetic component to ToM as well.  Therefore, studies such as the present one 
are important because they combine psychological and genetic contributions to the development 
of social cognitive abilities.  A strength of this study was that it used a cross-sectional design, 
which included children with and without ASD, as well as a longitudinal design using twins, 
  
 
25
which allowed for an assessment of the development of social cognitive abilities over time, as 
well as an investigation of the behavioral genetics of social cognitive abilities. 
Benefits of Using a Twin Sample 
Behavioral genetics is the study of genetic and environmental influences on behavioral 
phenotypes.  The use of a twin sample in behavioral genetic studies allows for the investigation 
of genetic influences on behavior (e.g., social cognition), parsing out influences due to genes and 
environment.  There are two types of twins included in a twin sample: identical or monozygotic 
(MZ) twins, who share the same genetic makeup, and fraternal or dizygotic (DZ) twins, who 
share approximately 50% of their DNA with their co-twin (Plomin, DeFries, McClearn, & 
McGuffin, 2000).  The difference between DZ twins and siblings who are not twins is that DZ 
twins share the same prenatal environment and are a member of the same birth cohort.  When 
studying twins, heritability estimates are computed in order to determine the genetic and 
environmental influences on a particular behavior.  For example, correlating the performance of 
MZ twins on ToM tasks and comparing that value to the correlation of the performance of DZ 
twins on the same tasks provided an estimate of the heritability of the understanding of theory of 
mind.  Higher correlations between MZ twins imply a greater genetic contribution (h2) on a 
particular behavior.  The equation for the correlation of MZ twins is: rMZ= h2 + c2 (Falconer, 
1960).  The equation for correlation of DZ twins (Falconer, 1960) is: rDZ= (1/2)h2 + c2 because 
DZ twins only share about 50% of their genetic makeup.  Heritability is estimated by subtracting 
the DZ equation from the MZ equation and doubling the difference, which results in the 
following equation: h2 = 2(rMZ - rDZ). 
Equal environments assumption (EEA).  When studying twins, it is imperative to 
include a discussion of the equal environments assumption (EEA).  This assumption states that 
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MZ and DZ twins share their environments to the same extent, which allows for valid 
comparisons between the two groups.  This assumption is crucial in the study of twins (Kendler, 
Neale, Kessler, & Heath, 1993).  One exception is that more similar twins will select more 
similar environments, thus drawing influences from both genetics and environment, which 
should be taken into consideration when analyzing the behavioral differences between twins 
(DiLalla, 2002b).  Neale and Cardon (1992) reported that some researchers believe that twin 
study samples are flawed based on the notion that MZ twins evoke a more similar response from 
those with whom they interact compared with DZ twins, which could affect twins' behavioral 
presentation.  This would invalidate the EEA because of the overestimation of the heritability 
between twins; therefore, researchers should be aware of the implications of the special case of 
twin samples.  Although violations of the EEA cannot be fully explained, several researchers in 
the field believe that the assumption is not being violated (Borkenau, Riemann, Angleitner, & 
Spinath, 2002; Derks, Dolan, & Boomsma, 2006; Klump, Holly, Iacono, McGue, & Wilson, 
2000).  Given the debate over the EEA, twin samples are best used with a longitudinal design in 
order to measure environmental influences over several points in time (Neale & Cardon, 1992).   
Behavioral Genetics of Social Cognition 
 Using twin studies is a useful way for researchers to investigate the genetic influence on 
the understanding of social cognition.  In general, there are limited studies on the behavioral 
genetics (i.e., heritability and environmental influence) of social cognitive abilities.  Results from 
a molecular genetics study were the first to show a connection between genes and social 
cognition (Skuse et al., 1997).  This study reported that a locus on the paternal X chromosome 
was implicated in the understanding of social cognition in children, given that females performed 
significantly better than males on the social cognitive tasks included in the study.  Recent studies 
by Skuse and colleagues (Good et al., 2003; Skuse, Morris, & Lawrence, 2003) reported that 
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impairments in social cognition in Turner’s syndrome, a genetic disorder in females in which one 
of the X chromosomes is missing, is linked to genes on the paternal X chromosome in some 
cases, specifically Xp 11.3 when there is a partial monosomy.  However, most single X 
chromosomes come from the mother in this disorder.  In addition, the authors of these studies 
reported that these genes likely influence social cognitive abilities through connections to the 
amygdala, which is larger in individuals with Turner’s syndrome compared with controls.  
Typically, decreased grey matter volumes are associated with impairment; however, in this case, 
the authors explained that hyperactivity of the amygdalae in their study was related to social 
difficulties.  The two studies (Good et al., 2003; Skuse et al., 2003) were comprised of different 
age ranges as well, suggesting that the volume differences were independent of age.  The 
bilateral amygdalae, which are part of the limbic system, are believed to be involved in the 
processing of negative emotional reactions and socially relevant information (Skuse et al., 2003).  
The link between emotional processing (via connections to the amygdala and the superior 
temporal sulcus) and social cognition is important given the fact that children with autism 
spectrum disorder have been shown to be impaired both structurally and functionally in both of 
these areas of the brain (Pelphrey, Shultz, Hudac, & Vander Wyk, 2011).  After the molecular 
studies were published suggesting a link between genetics and social cognitive abilities, 
behavioral genetics studies using twin samples followed. 
 Independent Pathway model. The covariance between twins in behavioral genetics 
studies can be explained using the Independent Pathway model (Neale & Cardon, 1992).  This 
model includes three main components: (A) genetic, (C) shared environmental, and (E) 
nonshared environmental effects.  The genetic effects can be additive (A) or not, depending on 
whether there is an effect of alleles at the same location on a particular chromosome (additive) or 
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at different locations (non-additive), which is the case with genetic dominance.  Shared 
environmental factors (C) make twins more similar, whereas nonshared environmental factors 
(E) result in twins appearing more dissimilar.  Shared environmental influences include factors 
such as the number of family members living in the home and the socioeconomic status of the 
family.  An example of a nonshared environmental factor is the difference in perceptions 
between twins following a move to another state.  Twin A had an easier time getting along with 
his teacher at his old school compared with Twin B, which led to a more positive perception of 
his new teacher at the new school than Twin B.  Thus, the same environmental influence (i.e., 
moving to a new school) resulted in different perceptions for each twin at the new school.  It 
should be noted that the nonshared environmental component is inherently confounded with 
measurement error.  Systems-level influences such as socio-cultural, political, and historical 
experiences are likely to influence measurement error and cannot be directly measured (Rutter, 
2001).  This may make the differences between twins appear larger than they actually are.  
 One of the first twin studies to investigate the genetic influence on social cognitive 
development using behavioral genetics was conducted by Hughes and Cutting (1999).  This 
study included a sample of 119 same-sex twin pairs who were three years of age at the time of 
data collection.  The children were given a series of eight false belief tasks, as well as the 
Vocabulary and Comprehension subtests of the Stanford-Binet.  The authors used structural 
equation modeling to estimate the genetic and environmental influences between twins on social 
cognitive functioning.  Intraclass correlations were .66 and .32 for MZ and DZ twins, 
respectively, which resulted in a heritability estimate of .66.  Given that verbal ability also was 
shown to be genetic, a bivariate modeling approach was used to determine the amount of overlap 
between these two abilities.  The authors reported that 67% of the genetic variance of theory of 
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mind was unrelated to verbal ability, suggesting that the overlap between these two abilities may 
not be as large as previously reported (Happé, 1995).  
 Another twin study by Scourfield, Martin, Lewis, and McGuffin (1999) provided further 
evidence that social cognitive abilities likely have a genetic basis.  Intraclass correlations 
between MZ and DZ twins were reported, suggesting a genetic influence on social cognition.  
More specifically, correlations for MZ twins ranged from 69% to 74% for males and females, 
respectively, and correlations for DZ twins were 47% and 26% for males and females, 
respectively.  Given the fact that the correlations for MZ and DZ twins were highly discrepant in 
females but not males, the authors noted that non-additive genetic effects were likely at play.  In 
addition, males were found to have more difficulty with social cognitive tasks than females in 
general, and the overall performance improved as all children got older.  Additionally, the 
genetic effects on performance for children under the age of 11 were greater than those for 
children over 11 years of age.  Thus, this study provided support for the heritability of social 
cognition and the impact of age on the genetic influence of social cognitive task performance.   
 In contrast, a more recent study (Hughes et al., 2005) reported that the understanding of 
social cognition was driven by environmental factors more than by genes.  Individual differences 
in the understanding of ToM were studied in a large sample of 1,116 same-sex five-year-old 
twins, who were a part of the Environmental Risk (E-Risk) Longitudinal Twin Study.  The 
children were given the Vocabulary subtest from the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scales of 
Intelligence-Revised (WPPSI-R; Wechsler, 1990) in addition to a series of ToM tasks with a 
forced-choice format that increased in difficulty level.  The ToM tasks included first-order and 
second-order false belief tasks as well as a belief-desire reasoning task.  The belief-desire 
reasoning task required the child to make an inference about a person’s emotional state based on 
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a false belief attribution.  Results from this study indicated that there was no difference between 
correlations for MZ and DZ twins (r = .53), which suggested that environmental rather than 
genetic factors may be influencing the individual differences in ToM performance observed in 
this large sample.  The shared environmental influences accounted for 48% of the variance, the 
nonshared environmental influence accounted for 45% of the variance, and genes only accounted 
for 7% of the variance.  It is important to note that these genetic and environmental differences 
were the same for boys and girls.  In contrast to the study by Hughes and Cutting (1999) that 
reported that the genetic influence of ToM and verbal abilities overlapped by 33%, the large 
study by Hughes and colleagues (2005) suggested that the genetic influence on verbal abilities 
completely overlapped with the genes that influenced ToM abilities.  In addition, there was a 
strong overlap between verbal abilities and ToM abilities in terms of shared environmental 
factors.  Similar to the previous study by Hughes and Cutting (1999), there were no sex 
differences in verbal ability or ToM ability.   
Given the wide range of results reported in the few behavioral genetics studies of ToM 
abilities in children, it is important to consider the reasons that may be influencing these 
differences.  One reason for the large disparity in outcomes (i.e., genetic versus environmental 
influences) between the more recent study by Hughes and colleagues (2005) and the study by 
Hughes and Cutting (1999) may be the markedly larger sample size used in the Hughes et al. 
(2005) study.  A second reason could be that the E-Risk Longitudinal Twin Study included a 
disproportionately high number of families with low socioeconomic status, which could be 
influencing the environmental effects, especially the influence of nonshared environmental 
experiences, which are unique to each individual.  Lastly, the Hughes and Cutting (1999) study 
consisted of three-year-olds and the larger Hughes et al. (2005) study was comprised of five-
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year-olds, suggesting that genetic influences on ToM abilities might be stronger in younger 
children. 
 In conclusion, results from behavioral genetics studies of twins investigating the 
understanding of theory of mind are mixed.  A few twin studies provide support for a strong 
genetic influence on ToM abilities (Hughes & Cutting, 1999; Scourfield et al., 1999), whereas a 
single, larger study by Hughes and colleagues (2005) reported a strong environmental influence 
and a negligible genetic influence on the understanding of ToM at the age of five.  Further 
studies are needed to help clarify these highly discordant results. 
The Role of Molecular Genetics in Social Cognition  
 With advances in technology, the field of genetics has exploded in recent years.  The 
molecular genetics of most disorders are complex, with the exception of a few rare disorders that 
have been linked to a single gene mutation (e.g., cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia).  In the vast 
majority of psychiatric disorders, the genetic influences are often polygenetic and multifactorial, 
meaning that they result from the combination of many genes and environmental factors (e.g., 
prenatal environment, parental psychopathology).  The relation between genes and the resulting 
behavioral phenotype is complicated; an understanding of biological terms (e.g., DNA, RNA, 
risk alleles) is essential to the comprehension of the field of molecular genetics. 
Biology of molecular genetics.  Each individual’s genetic information is located within 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecules (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/ 
genetics_genome.html).  A particular gene is a stretch of DNA that encodes information from an 
individual’s genetic makeup.  Gene expression is the process by which that information produces 
an observable behavioral phenotype.  This process is driven by the transcription of double-
stranded DNA into single-stranded RNA, or ribonucleic acid, a complementary copy of DNA.  
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This single-stranded RNA, or messenger RNA (mRNA), is then translated into a protein after a 
series of processing steps (e.g., folding into a three-dimensional structure), which is necessary 
for the protein to become functional.   
The structure of DNA and RNA are similar, but the molecules differ in a few important 
ways.  For example, both are comprised of several smaller components such as nucleic acids, 
which are made up of several nucleotides.  Each nucleotide has a five-carbon sugar (ribose), a 
nitrogenous base, and a phosphate group (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/ 
genetics_genome.html).  DNA molecules are missing one oxygen atom, which results in the 
prefix “deoxy.”  The structure of DNA is a double helix, consisting of two backbones, which 
wrap around each other.  The four possible nitrogenous base pairs in DNA include adenine (A), 
thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G).  These bases are found along the backbones of the 
helix.  The two strands are connected by chemical bonds across base pairs.  For example, the “A” 
on one strand is attracted to the “T” on the opposite strand.  The structure of DNA and RNA are 
similar, but complementary, and the single-stranded RNA includes a base called “uracil” in the 
place of “thymine,” which is found in DNA.  These base pair sequences provide instructions for 
how a given protein is synthesized, which is dictated by the order of the base pairs. 
Genes are segments of DNA that code for a particular protein or proteins.  Each 
individual receives two copies of each gene, one from their mother and one from their father.  
These copies can be similar or different.  Different versions of the same gene are referred to as 
alleles.  One gene may have several different alleles, but offspring will only receive two alleles 
for any gene, one from each parent (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/ 
genetics_genome.html).  When the two inherited alleles are the same, they are referred to as 
“homozygous,” and when they are different, they are referred to as “heterozygous.”  Although 
  
 
33
humans share a large portion of their genetic makeup, only identical twins have exactly the same 
DNA.  The special case of identical twins, as discussed in a previous section, allows for the 
ability to study genetic and environmental influences to a specific trait or disorder such as the 
understanding of social cognitive abilities in children with and without autism spectrum disorder 
in this study. 
Risk alleles.  An understanding of alleles is not complete without a discussion of what it 
means to have a “risk allele.”  The presence of a risk allele results in a protein with an atypical 
function, which is often associated with an increased risk of developing a disease or disorder 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/ genetics_genome.html).  For example, when a 
woman has a mutation in the BRCA1 gene, which is responsible for tumor suppression, the 
presence of this risk allele dramatically increases the likelihood of developing breast or ovarian 
cancer.  It is important to note that “risk” is a statistical term that results from the comparison of 
groups of individuals with and without a specific condition (e.g., depression, anxiety) and should 
not be applied to individuals.  A risk allele, or a common variation within genes, is also known 
as a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP).  SNPs occur when a single nitrogenous base change 
occurs in the DNA sequence.  Although these are quite common, and often are benign, certain 
variants have been found to increase the risk of specific groups of people in developing common 
diseases or disorders.  
Researchers study these risk alleles using candidate gene studies, which allows for causal 
inferences to be made from the level of genotype to the level of phenotype.  Genes that are 
chosen for study in these studies are included based on their theoretical link to biological 
pathways underlying a given disease or disorder.  Given this link, when an association is found 
between a risk allele and a particular condition, it is assumed that the gene is connected to the 
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protein produced in the identified biological pathway, which is the case with the BRCA1 gene 
involved in tumor suppression in breast and ovarian cancer.  On the other hand, when an 
association is not found, evidence against the biological connection is implied 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/ genetics_genome.html).   
The neurotransmitters dopamine and serotonin.  The candidate genes in this study are 
common variations of the genes that synthesize the transporters and receptors used in 
conjunction with the neurotransmitters dopamine and serotonin.  These neurotransmitters have 
been linked to human social behavior, specifically social cognition, in a recent study by Skuse 
and Gallagher (2011).  The authors explained how these neurotransmitter systems influence 
social interactions through dopaminergic connections to reward pathways and serotoninergic 
links to emotional regulation.  More specifically, dopamine is associated with the rewards gained 
through building social relationships, and serotonin is related to emotional states associated with 
social interactions such as subjective feelings, physiological arousal, desire to interact with 
others, and the feelings associated with being included or excluded from a group.  The authors 
specifically implicated the pathways of the “social brain” that underlie the ability to take 
another’s perspective, including the dorsomedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, the 
paracingulate cortex, the bilateral temporoparietal junctions, and the amygdala (Skuse & 
Gallagher, 2011).   
Genetic variations in the dopamine and serotonin genes have been shown to affect the 
levels of dopamine and serotonin available for use in the brain.  The dopamine receptor D4 gene 
(DRD4) has a 48-base pair variable number tandem repeat (VNTR), or a location on a gene 
where a short sequence repeats itself, polymorphism in exon III in the D4 receptor.  It is 
hypothesized that the presence of a common 7-repeat allele may lead to reduced expression of 
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the DRD4 gene, which reduces the intracellular concentration of the second messenger cyclic 
AMP, which in turn causes a cascade of signaling events (Lachowicz & Sibley, 1997).  The final 
result is a decreased amount of dopamine available in the system for binding. 
The serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR) is a monoamine transporter protein that 
encodes the serotonin reuptake transporter (5-HTT).  The 5-HTT is responsible for transporting 
the unused neurotransmitter serotonin from the synaptic space back into the presynaptic neurons 
so it can be released again.  The promotor region of the SLC6A4 gene contains a polymorphism 
with “short” and “long” repeats in the 5-HTT-linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR).  The 
short variation has 14 repeats of a sequence and the long variation has 16 repeats (Nakamura, 
Ueno, Sano, & Tanabe, 2000).  In addition, the short variation leads to less transcription of 
SLC6A4, which leads to the creation of fewer 5-HTT proteins and lower 5-HTT expression, 
which increases extracellular concentrations of serotonin in the brain.  Increased levels of 
serotonin are associated with overstimulation of nerves; the recycling of 5-HT by the transporters 
prevents this overloading (Canli & Lesch, 2007).  Thus, the creation of more SERT proteins (i.e., 
the protein produced when the LA allele is present) helps to maintain homeostasis at the synapse 
site.  One study showed a decrease in grey matter in the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex and 
the amygdala for those who had the short/short allelic combination compared with those with the 
long/long genotype.  A meta-analysis of the association between the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism 
and individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) was conducted given the conflicting results 
reported in previous studies (Huang & Santangelo, 2008).  This review and meta-analysis 
showed no overall relation between 5-HTTLPR and ASD even after separating out families with 
only one child with ASD from those with more than one affected individual. 
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The 5-HTTLPR polymorphism has been extensively studied in psychiatric populations 
such as those with ASD, depression, and anxiety since the mid-1990s with mixed results 
(Wendland, Martin, Kruse, Lesch, & Murphy, 2006).  A recent focus has shifted to further 
subdividing the short and long genetic variations in order to explain these conflicting findings.  A 
functional variation was identified within the long variant, known as LA or LG.  LA was 
associated with higher levels of 5-HTT expression and lower levels of extracellular serotonin, 
whereas LG was more similar to the short variant, or the S allele (Praschak-Rieder et al., 2007).  
Given this important distinction, the short and long variants were further subdivided into S, LA, 
or LG in this study in order to account for the specialized function of the LA genotype.  
Abnormalities in the serotonin system have been linked to different disorders such as those with 
and without depression (Cannon et al., 2007).  Increased levels of serotonin have been shown to 
decrease aggression and increase cooperation and vice versa in a primate study (Carver & Miller, 
2006).  Studies in humans and primates also have shown that increased levels of serotonin 
activity have positive effects on social interactions and cooperation, whereas the opposite also is 
true (Cools, Roberts, & Robbins, 2008). 
Dopamine and social cognition.  There is significant evidence to suggest that the 
neurotransmitter dopamine is related to the understanding of ToM in humans.  Two studies using 
functional neuroimaging techniques or electroencephalography (EEG) in preschoolers have 
implicated the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) in the development of ToM (Liu, 
Sabbagh, Gehring, & Wellman, 2009; Sabbagh, Bowman, Evraire, & Ito, 2009).  Given that the 
dMPFC is a main target of dopamine projections, dopamine may be associated with developing 
and maintaining functioning of social reasoning in preschoolers (Popolo, McCarthy, & Bhide, 
2004).  Developmentally, this is important because the brains of preschoolers are maturing at a 
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rapid rate.  Another study of 91 four- to five-year-old typically developing preschoolers showed 
that individual differences in rates of eye blinking, which was used as a proxy for dopamine 
functioning, successfully predicted the performance on ToM tasks (Lackner et al., 2010).  These 
effects remained even after controlling for executive functioning (i.e., performance on a Stroop-
like task), language ability, sex differences, and age.  A recent study provided further support for 
the link between dopamine and the understanding of ToM (Lackner et al., 2012).  In this study of 
73 typically developing 42- to 54-month-olds, polymorphisms of the dopamine D4 receptor gene 
(DRD4) were associated with ToM performance. 
Dopamine has also been shown to be associated with learning, which is a crucial 
component to the successful completion of ToM tasks.  In an animal study by Schultz (2000), 
dopamine was released during situations in which the expected event did not match with an 
unexpected outcome.  Thus, the author proposed that dopamine may be responsible for plasticity 
of neural cells, providing updated information based on expected versus actual outcomes and 
adjusting future expectations. 
Serotonin and social cognition.  Much like dopamine, there is a documented link 
between serotonin and social cognitive abilities in the literature; however, studies investigating 
this connection are limited in humans.  Serotonin is linked to a wide range of behavioral and 
emotional functions including behavioral inhibition, appetite, aggression, mood, sleep, and 
navigating social situations (Rogers, 2011).  Primate studies have shown elevated serotonin 
decreases aggression and increases cooperation and effectiveness in social situations and vice 
versa (Carver & Miller, 2006).  In both animals and humans, greater serotonin activity positively 
influences social interaction and cooperation, whereas low serotonin levels have the opposite 
effect (Cools, Roberts, & Robbins, 2008). 
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In addition, a recent study by Bosia et al. (2011) reported that ToM abilities were 
deficient in a clinical population of 118 individuals with schizophrenia when compared with 
controls.  In this study, prefrontal cortex dysfunction was related to difficulties taking another 
person’s perspective.  The authors also investigated the specific effect of a functional 
polymorphism of the serotonin 1A receptor (5-HT1A-R), which is involved in the regulation of 
both serotonin and dopamine transmission.  More specifically, the 5-HT1A-R is involved in the 
decreased production of serotonin, and it directly influences the release of dopamine in the 
prefrontal cortex (Rollema et al., 2000).  The authors reported that individuals with the C/C 
genotype performed better than those individuals with either the C/G or the G/G genotypes and 
concluded that this effect was likely related to interaction of serotonin and dopamine working 
together to influence social functioning.  The findings from the study by Bosia and colleagues 
(2011) and an earlier study by Abu-Akel (2003) provided support for the influence of both 
serotonin and dopamine levels on ToM performance in individuals with schizophrenia after 
controlling for other cognitive abilities (i.e., IQ and executive functioning). 
In conclusion, human and animal studies of dopamine and serotonin have provided strong 
evidence for a link between risk alleles associated with these neurotransmitters and performance 
on measures of social cognitive abilities (Abu-Akel, 2003; Bosia et al., 2011; Skuse & Gallagher, 
2011; Lackner et al., 2010, 2012).  Dopamine has been linked to reward pathways, and the bonds 
created during social interactions are inherently rewarding.  Serotonin is associated with a wide 
variety of emotional states, including the desire to interact with other people.  More genetic 
research on clinical populations typically impaired in the understanding of ToM such as those 
with ASD are needed in order to better understand the underlying biological pathways affecting 
these complex cognitive abilities.  Given that behavioral traits and psychiatric disorders are 
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rarely caused by single gene mutations, it is crucial to investigate both the genetic and 
environmental influences of a particular condition, which was best accomplished in this study 
through the use of a twin sample.  In addition, the long repeats of the DRD4 polymorphism and 
the short variant of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism were the focus of the genetic analysis given 
their connection to the development of the social brain. 
The Present Study 
 The goals of this study were three-fold.  First, I investigated whether performance on a 
theory of mind task at ages three and four predicted performance on theory of mind (ToM) tasks 
at follow-up (i.e., one time point between 6 to 10 years of age).  The longitudinal portion of this 
study used a sample of typically developing twins, most of whom were tested in the past as part 
of SITSS (87%), but some of whom were newly recruited as part of the larger study (13%).  The 
follow-up testing comprised five measures of ToM, which increased in difficulty and included 
the addition of an age-appropriate measure of ToM that assessed the understanding of nonliteral 
communication (i.e., sarcasm). Second, I compared the performance of typically developing 
twins to children with ASD on the ToM tasks, given that children with ASD have been shown to 
be impaired in processing social information, especially when emotional cues are incorporated.  
In addition to the ToM tasks, all children were administered the receptive and expressive subtests 
of the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals, 4th Edition (CELF-4) as a way to control 
for language differences between groups.  This cross-sectional analysis allowed comparisons 
between groups to investigate the extent of impairment in social cognitive abilities in children 
with ASD.  Third, I tested whether different genotypes were related to performance on ToM 
tasks to better understand the role of molecular genetics in the development of social cognition in 
both groups of children.  Prior behavioral genetics studies have indicated that ToM is heritable, 
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and there is evidence from molecular genetics studies to suggest that risk alleles associated with 
the neurotransmitters dopamine and serotonin may be linked to deficits in social cognitive 
functioning.  The current study added to the literature by expanding upon the role of dopamine 
and serotonin in the understanding of social cognition. 
Hypotheses 
 This study sought to add to the literature by investigating the psychological and genetic 
contributions to the development of social cognition through the use of a longitudinal and a 
cross-sectional design.  The hypotheses for the current study were as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 tested the development of social cognitive abilities in typically developing children 
over time.  
1a) Performance at ages three and four was expected to predict performance on all five 
ToM tasks at follow-up (i.e., one time between ages 6 to 10).  Thus, it was hypothesized 
that performance at ages three and four would be positively correlated with scores at 
follow-up on individual tasks. 
1b) Younger children in the follow-up study were expected not to pass as many of the 
five ToM measures as older children in the follow-up study, thus generating a lower 
overall total score.  Therefore, it was hypothesized that age and total score would be 
positively correlated in the follow-up sample. 
Hypothesis 2 tested the group differences in ToM abilities in children with and without autism 
spectrum disorder. 
2a) Children (ages 6 to 10) with ASD were expected not to score as high as typically 
developing children on each of the five measures of ToM included in the current study 
given their deficits in social cognitive abilities.   
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2b) Children with ASD were expected to have significantly more difficulties on the 
CBCL scales related to social abilities (i.e., social problems, thought problems) and 
emotional functioning (i.e., anxiety, social withdrawal) compared with typically 
developing children.  Social problems are a core deficit in children with ASD, and 
emotional processing difficulties make navigating social situations even more difficult for 
these children. 
2c) Autism symptom severity as measured by the social cognition, social communication, 
and social awareness treatment subscales on the SRS-2 was expected to be negatively 
correlated with performance on all five ToM tasks. 
Hypothesis 3 tested whether genes in general and different genotypes of the DRD4 and 5-
HTTLPR genes in particular would predict performance on ToM tasks. 
3a) It was hypothesized that ToM would be heritable, which was assessed by comparing 
the correlations of MZ and DZ twins at all ages.  It was expected that MZ twins would 
perform more similarly than DZ twins at all ages (behavioral genetics hypothesis). 
3b) Participants who have at least one S or LG allele in the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism or 
six or more repeats in the DRD4 polymorphism would perform worse on ToM tasks at all 
ages than those with only 5-HTT LA alleles or only fewer than six repeats of the DRD4 
polymorphism, respectively.  Participants who have both risk genotypes (i.e., at least one 
risk allele in both genes, DRD4 and 5-HTTLPR) would be more impaired on ToM tasks 
than those with only one of the DRD4 or the 5-HTTLPR genes, as well as those without 
any risk alleles (molecular genetics hypothesis).  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Participants 
The first part of this study included twin pairs or triplets who participated in the Southern 
Illinois Twins and Siblings Study (SITSS; DiLalla, 2002a) at ages three and/or four, shortly after 
their birthdays each year, as well as new families who had not been tested previously.  In total 
115 families were targeted for participation, and 62 families participated in the current study, 
which resulted in a response rate of 54%, which is considered to be a high response rate given 
the nature of the study and the geographical area in which it is being conducted.  Of those who 
did not participate, 23% were not interested for various reasons (four families lived too far away, 
three families were not interested/did not have time, three families had children who aged out of 
the study by the time they were contacted, and no reason was documented for two families), 28% 
were unable to be contacted, and the reason for not participating was unknown for the remaining 
49% (the specific information for why families did not participate was not recorded until halfway 
through the study).  We attempted to contact 23 new families, and the remaining 92 were 
families with multiples who participated in SITSS who were contacted three to six years after 
their initial participation.  The children who were tested previously were between the ages of 6-
10 at the time of follow-up.  Of the 62 families in the follow-up study, which resulted in a total 
sample of 127 children, 69 children were tested at ages three and four (54%), five were tested at 
age three only (4%), 18 were tested at age four only (14%), 17 children were tested at age 5 as a 
part of SITSS but were not tested at ages three or four (13%), and eight new families 
participated, including seven twin pairs and a set of quadruplets (n = 18 children; 14%). 
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The second part of this study included 25 6- to 10-year-old boys who had previously been 
diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD).  Given the fact that four times as many boys 
are diagnosed with ASD than girls, only boys were included in this sample.  All but one of the 
children in the ASD sample were recruited through the Center for Autism Spectrum Disorders 
(CASD).  The only child who was not recruited there was contacted using information initially 
gathered for SITSS.  (This child and his co-twin were excluded from SITSS several years ago 
after he was diagnosed with ASD as a toddler.)  Most, but not all, of the children were evaluated 
by clinicians at the CASD at SIU.  The children who were evaluated there were administered the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 1989) in order to verify their 
diagnosis, following an initial screening visit. The remainder received diagnoses from their 
primary care physicians; however, each child’s diagnosis was verified by the staff at the CASD 
prior to including them in interventions or research studies.  One set of MZ twins was included in 
the data collection; however, only one twin was included in the analyses in order to avoid 
violating statistical assumptions.  All of the children tested for the current study were high-
functioning as evident by their ability to attend a regular education classroom for most, if not all, 
of the school day.  Although the cognitive level of the children was not formally assessed as part 
of this study, cognitive data were available for a portion of the children with ASD (see Table 1).   
 A series of ANOVAs and a Chi-square test were run to determine group differences in 
demographic variables.  For these analyses, only one randomly selected twin was included when 
comparing the typically developing group to the children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
to avoid violating the independence of samples assumption.  There were no significant 
differences in age, F(1, 85) = 3.00, p = .09, SES, F(1, 74) = 1.36, p = .248, or race/ethnicity, Χ2 
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(2, N = 87) = 2.75, p = .25 between groups.  The total sample was 86% Caucasian, 7% African 
American, and 7% "Other" or mixed race (see Table 1 for sample descriptive statistics).   
Measures 
Age 3 and 4 Testing 
Demographic questionnaire.  All families were mailed a demographics questionnaire 
(see Appendix A) that included questions related to family information such as marital status, 
income, family structure, age, education level, occupation, and race.  The Hollingshead Index 
(Bonjean, Hill, & McLemore, 1967) was used to calculate a socioeconomic status (SES) score 
for each family based on occupation status, educational attainment, and family income.  
Education level was rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 = some high school or 
high school degree to 5 = advanced training beyond college degree.  Each occupation also was 
rated on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = unskilled laborer to 7 = high-level professional.  
Lastly, family income was scored on a 12-point Likert-type scale, with incomes ranging from 1 = 
less than $5,000 to 12 = greater than $55,000.  Given that the scores are not on the same scale, all 
the education and occupation scores were put on a 12-point scale by multiplying the education 
scores by (12/5) and the occupation scores by (12/7) prior to averaging the scores.  Because data 
on paternal education and occupation level were missing from four families, the maternal 
education, maternal occupation, and family income scores were averaged to generate a maternal 
SES score (see Table 1). 
DNA collection.  A laboratory at the University of Colorado has previously analyzed 
buccal cells collected for DNA analysis on most, but not all, of the twins who participated in the 
follow-up study as part of their participation in SITSS.  As part of the present study, buccal cell 
samples were collected from all children with ASD, as well as from any twins whose DNA 
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samples had never been collected (i.e., new families) or were missing for any reason.  Collection 
of buccal cells allowed for the investigation of the specific risk alleles implicated in social 
cognitive processing.  In relation to the DRD4 gene, the number of repeats were indicated for 
each sample: two repeats and four repeats of the DRD4 polymorphism are common, non-risk 
variants; however, the presence of greater than or equal to six repeats in the DRD4 gene is 
considered “high risk” in clinical samples (Faraone et al., 2005).  The high-risk allele results in 
less dopamine binding to receptors.  Additionally, the promotor region of the 5-HTTLPR gene 
was classified as one of three alleles: S, LA, and LG.  Both the LG and S alleles result in decreased 
serotonin transporter (5-HTT) mRNA levels and decreased 5-HTT transmission, which leaves 
more serotonin in the presynaptic cleft that typically would have been recycled by the 
transporters (Praschak-Rieder et al., 2007).  Therefore, risk alleles disrupt neurotransmitter 
action in the brain, which can result in atypical behaviors in certain groups of individuals.  
Lastly, given the large number of genetic tests that were run in this study, a Bonferroni 
correction was done by dividing the p-value of .05 by 5 (p = .01), which is the number of social 
cognitive tasks included in each analysis for each group. 
Theory of mind tasks.  All children were administered the same two similar false belief 
tasks at ages three and four (Gopnik & Astington, 1988).  The original protocol was modified 
slightly to account for the fact that each twin was asked to reference their co-twin’s belief, rather 
than asking each child what a peer might be thinking about the situation presented.  Each twin 
was tested separately in a room away from their co-twin.  A total of 17 trained undergraduate 
research assistants coded these tasks from videotapes.  Each child from a twin pair was coded by 
a different trained coder to reduce bias.  Average inter-rater reliability for coders who have rated 
the age three and four protocol is .96 (range was .87-1.0). 
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Theory of Mind I.  Each twin was shown a Playdoh container with incongruent contents 
(i.e., crayons) and asked what she thought was inside prior to seeing the contents.  Next, the twin 
was shown the contents of the Playdoh container, the crayons were placed back into the 
container, and the lid was closed.  Then, the twin was asked what she thought was inside the 
container before being shown the contents.  (This will be referred to as the "memory question" 
from this point forward because the twin was asked to remember what she had initially believed 
was in the container versus what she now knows is inside the container.)  Finally, the child was 
asked what she thought her co-twin would say was in the Playdoh container.  (This will be 
referred to as the "contents question" from this point forward).  Scoring ranged from 0 to 1 for 
both the memory question and the contents question.  This scoring method was initially 
described by Wellman and Liu (2004).  Specifically, a child received a score of 1 on the memory 
question if she said she remembered thinking there was Playdoh inside the container, but she 
received a score of 0 if she said there were crayons (or another incorrect answer) in the container.  
She received a score of 1 on the contents question if she said that her co-twin would think there 
was Playdoh in the container, and she received a score of 0 if she said her co-twin would think 
there were crayons (or any other incorrect answer) in the container. 
Theory of Mind II.  Each twin was shown a box of crayons with incongruent contents 
(i.e., blocks) and asked what he thought was inside prior to seeing the contents.  Next, the box of 
crayons was opened to reveal the blocks, the blocks were returned to the crayon box, and the lid 
was closed.  Then, the twin was asked what he thought was inside the container before being 
shown the contents (i.e., the "memory question").  Finally, the child was asked what he thought 
his co-twin would say was in the box of crayons (i.e., the "contents question").  Again, scoring 
ranged from 0 to 1 for both the memory question and the contents question, using an identical 
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scoring scheme to Theory of Mind I.  See Appendix B for Theory of Mind Protocol (Age 3 and 4 
Testing).  
Creating total scores for ToM performance at ages three and four.  First, memory scores 
at ages three and four were computed by adding the two scores (memory from Theory of Mind I 
and memory from Theory of Mind II) at each age and then dividing by two.  The same was done 
for ToM contents.  This resulted in a total of four average scores: memory at age three, contents 
at age three, memory at age four, and contents at age four.  These four average scores were used 
as dependent variables in the main analyses.  The memory at age three score was not 
significantly correlated with the memory at age four score, r(69) = .12, p = .348, nor was the 
contents at age three score correlated with the contents at age four score, r(69) = -.02, p = .897, 
which suggests that performance at the younger age was not related to performance one year 
later. 
Current Study 
Demographic questionnaire.  The same demographic questionnaire used in the age 
three and four testing protocols in the younger twin study was included in the mailing packets to 
all study participants in the follow-up study.  This was scored the same way that was described in 
the previous section in order to obtain an SES score for each family based on maternal education, 
occupation, and family income (see Table 1).  
DNA collection.  The same procedure used in SITSS (DiLalla, 2002a; DiLalla, Gheyara, 
& Bersted, 2013) was followed to obtain buccal cells from the participants in the current study.  
Most, but not all, of the twins had their DNA collected previously; therefore, buccal cells were 
collected from all of the children with ASD (without any problems), as well as those twins 
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whose DRD4 and/or 5-HTTLPR gene data were missing or never obtained.  These samples were 
sent to the University of Colorado in two batches to be analyzed. 
When only one child was selected from each family, the genotype breakdown for the 
sample used in all molecular genetic analyses was as follows: 23 individuals (27%) with no risk 
allele and 63 individuals (73%) with 1 or 2 risk alleles for the 5-HTTLPR gene; 51 individuals 
(59%) with fewer than six repeats and 35 individuals (41%) with six or more repeats for the 
DRD4 gene; and 15 individuals (17%) without any risk alleles in either gene, 44 individuals 
(51%) with at least one risk allele in either gene, and 27 individuals (31%) with at least one risk 
allele in both genes (see Table 11). 
Theory of mind tasks.  Five measures of ToM were administered in the same order to all 
study participants in the current study.  All twins underwent a one-hour testing session as part of 
a larger emotion study that was approved by the Southern Illinois University School of Medicine 
in Springfield, IL.  The administration procedure was designed such that the twins completed all 
five ToM measures, but each successive ToM task was separated by a different measure in an 
alternating pattern.  The testing session took place in Lindegren Hall on the SIUC campus.  For 
the children with ASD, the testing battery only included the five measures of ToM abilities and 
was completed in 15 minutes at the Center for Autism Spectrum Disorders at SIU.  The group of 
testers, who included the principal investigator of the research lab, six graduate students (myself 
included), and one advanced undergraduate student, were trained to precisely follow a written 
script while administering the testing battery, and responses were written down verbatim during 
the testing sessions.  Trained testers scored all ToM tasks from oral responses during the testing 
session, and I double-checked the scoring of the five ToM items for the total sample prior to 
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double data entry.  The administration and scoring procedures for the five ToM measures are 
described below (see Appendix C for the Theory of Mind Protocol for the current study). 
 Contents False Belief (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). This task assessed each 
child's understanding that, despite a certain fact, someone might believe something differently.  
The administration of this single task was similar to the false belief tasks administered during the 
age three and four testing protocol for SITSS, but there were a few notable differences.  Similar 
to Theory of Mind I and II in SITSS, each child was shown the Playdoh container, asked about 
its contents (without knowing what is inside), shown the unexpected contents (i.e., Q-tips), and 
then asked what was in the container.  Next, each child was shown a toy figure and asked if he 
has ever seen inside the container.  The child was then asked what he thought the toy figure 
would think was inside the container.  Lastly, each twin was asked what he thought his co-twin 
would think was in the container, and every child with ASD was asked what a well-known peer 
at school (whose name was provided in advance by the parent without the child knowing) would 
think was in the container.  The method for the children with ASD was selected as the best way 
to approximate the procedure used in the twin protocol.  Scoring ranged from 0 to 1, with a score 
of 1 given if the child identified that the toy figure and his co-twin/peer thought Playdoh was 
inside the container before seeing the contents.    
Explicit False Belief (Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Wellman & Bartsch, 1989).  This task 
measured each child's ability to understand that someone’s behavior might be different based on 
a mistaken belief.  Each child was shown a toy figure and a sheet of paper with two pictures: a 
backpack and a closet.  The child was told that the toy figure is looking for his mittens, which 
might be in the backpack or the closet.  The examiner told the child that the mittens are in the 
backpack, but the toy figure thinks they are in the closet.  The child was asked where he thought 
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the toy figure would look for the mittens (known as the "target question") and where the mittens 
really are (known as the "reality question").  To be correct, the child needed to answer both 
questions correctly (i.e., the toy figure will look in the closet, but the mittens are really in the 
backpack), which resulted in a score of 1.  If the child was incorrect on either or both of the 
questions, he received a score of 0. 
Belief-Emotion (Harris et al., 2000).  This task assessed each child's understanding of the 
fact that someone may have a different emotion because of a false belief.  Each child was shown 
a toy figure and a small, closed Cheerios box with bouncy balls inside.  The examiner asked the 
child what she thought was inside the box.  Next, the examiner spoke for the toy figure, saying 
that Cheerios are her favorite snack, and then has the toy figure leave.  The child was then shown 
that there are bouncy balls inside the box instead of Cheerios.  The toy figure was brought back, 
and the child was told that the toy figure has never seen inside the box.  Then, the child was 
asked how the toy figure would feel when she gets the box before seeing inside (this is referred 
to as the "target question").  Next, the examiner opened the Cheerios box and let the toy figure 
see inside.  Finally, the child was asked how the toy figure would feel after looking inside the 
box (this is referred to as the "emotion-control question").  Scoring ranged from 0 to 1, with a 
correct score indicated when the child responded "happy" to the target question and "sad" to the 
emotion-control question.  The child was given a score of 0 if he responded to either or both of 
the questions incorrectly. 
Real-Apparent Emotion.  This measure tested each child's understanding of the fact that 
someone can show a different emotion than the one they are feeling.  Each child was shown a 
piece of paper with three faces (i.e., happy, sad, and neutral) in order to test their understanding 
of these emotions.  All children were able to correctly identify each of the three emotions on the 
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piece of paper.  Next, a picture of a boy was shown from the back so that the facial expression is 
unknown.  The examiner then told a story about a boy named Matt who feels one way inside, but 
looks a different way on his face.  Matt’s friend, Rosie, tells a joke about Matt that is not nice, 
which causes others to laugh; however, Matt does not want his friends to know that he feels bad, 
so he hides how he truly feels.  The child was then asked two questions to test their memory of 
the story, one asking about what the other children did when Rosie told a mean joke about Matt, 
and another about what the children might do if they knew how it made Matt feel.  Finally, the 
child was asked how Matt really felt after being teased, choosing between “happy,” “sad,” and 
“so-so” (this is referred to as the “target-feel question”), and how Matt tried to make his face 
look, again choosing between “happy,” “sad,” and “so-so” (this is referred to as the “target-look 
question”).  Scoring ranged from 0 to 1, with a correct score attained if the “target-feel question” 
was more negative than the “target-look question” (i.e., the child stated that Matt felt worse than 
the face that he made in front of his friends).   
Understanding Sarcasm (Peterson et al., 2012).  This task measured each child's 
understanding of the fact that the meaning of words is not always to be taken literally.  The 
understanding sarcasm task is a newly validated measure of understanding non-literal language, 
which has been shown to be sensitive to differences in social cognitive abilities at this age group 
(i.e., only 25% of typically developing nine-year-old children passed this task; Peterson et al., 
2012).  Given that the children included in this study were school-aged at the time of data 
collection, it was appropriate and useful to include this more difficult task in the current study.   
Each child was shown a picture of the back of a girl's and boy's head, as well as a picnic 
scene.  The examiner read a story aloud about how the boy and girl were planning on having a 
picnic, but after they got the food out, it rained and ruined the food.  Then, the girl in the story 
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said, "It's a lovely day for a picnic" without any inflection or a sarcastic tone.  The child was 
asked whether what the girl said was true (this is referred to as a "control question"), why the girl 
said it was a "lovely day for a picnic" (this is referred to as the "test question"), and if the girl 
was happy about the rain (this is referred to as the "comprehension question").  Scores ranged 
from 0 to 1.  A correct "test question" included some mention of the words "sarcasm," or "irony," 
or a description of the use of nonliteral language (e.g., using the word "opposite" or saying the 
girl was trying to be mean or mocking the boy), which resulted in a score of 1.    
Total score for all five ToM measures.  Each of the five measures was scored from 0 to 1 
and then scores were added together to create a single total ToM score, which ranged from 0 to 
5.  Each measure included a “control question” in order to assess whether the child understood 
the question being asked.  To receive full credit, the child needed to answer the control question 
correctly in addition to the test question.  If the child failed any control questions, but passed the 
accompanying test question, the child did not receive credit and got a score of 0 on that item. 
Previous studies have shown that it was rare for children to fail the control question, but then 
pass the test question (Peterson et al., 2012).  Indeed, this only happened on one occasion on the 
real-apparent emotion task, which resulted in a score of 0 for this child in the ASD sample.   
Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals, 4th Edition (CELF-4; Semel, Wiig, & 
Secord, 2003).  The CELF–4 was selected for use in the current study due to the fact that it has 
been shown to be sensitive to the language difficulties exhibited by children with intellectual 
disability or autism spectrum disorder.  The CELF-4 can be administered to individuals aged 5-
21 and consists of subtests measuring core language, receptive language, expressive language, 
language structure, language content, language memory, and working memory.  For the purposes 
of the current study, only the receptive and expressive language subtests from Word Classes 
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were administered in order to obtain a measure of current language functioning.  These two 
subtests assessed each child’s understanding of relationships between words with minimal 
language demands.  Results from these two subtests generated scaled scores for receptive and 
expressive language as well as a total language scaled score.   
The CELF-4 was normed on 2,650 youth aged 5-21 years (200 from each age group from 
5-17 and 50 from each age group from 17-21). The sample was diverse in terms of age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, and parental education.  The test’s previous edition (CELF-3) did not include 
students with disabilities in the norm sample; however, the current version’s norm sample was 
comprised of youth in special education and youth who were diagnosed with speech-language 
disorders (9% and 7%, respectively). 
Internal reliability estimates for subtests (.70-.91) and composite scores (.89-.95) were 
adequate in the overall sample, as well as for the clinical subgroups assessed (i.e., Language 
Learning Disorder, Mental Retardation, Autism, and Hearing Impairment).  Test-retest reliability 
scores completed on a subsample of youth (N = 320 students) after a delay of approximately 16 
days produced scores above .90.  Inter-rater reliabilities for the seven subtests, which required 
subjective scorer judgment, ranged from .88-.99, which suggests that there is high inter-rater 
agreement. Support for validity for the CELF-4 comes from factor analyses that resulted in high 
correlations between the core language score and the individual indices, as well as between the 
receptive and expressive subscales and their respective composite scores.  In addition, there were 
moderate correlations between the current edition and the previous edition.  The receptive 
language score was used in the subsequent analyses to control for receptive language differences 
between groups; the expressive and total language scores were reported for descriptive purposes 
(Table 1). 
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Child Behavior Checklist for ages 6-18 (CBCL/6-18; Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001).  
The CBCL/6-18 is a commonly used parent-report questionnaire to assess the emotional and 
behavioral functioning of children aged 6-18.  The CBCL consists of 113 questions, which 
comprise 8 subscales (attention problems, social problems, aggressive behavior, somatic 
complaints, withdrawal symptoms, delinquent behaviors, thought problems, and 
anxious/depressed behavior).  Parents rated children’s behavior over the past six months on a 3-
point scale, with 0 = Not True, 1 = Sometimes or Somewhat True, and 2 = Very True or Often 
True.  Individual items were summed to create total scores for each of the subscales, and T-
scores were generated separately for each subscale based on separate gender norms.  The norm-
referenced sample was diverse in terms of socioeconomic status and race/ethnicity.  The manual 
listed information on reliability and validity, with high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha 
.54-.96 for ages 4-11), test-retest reliability (r = .82-.95), construct validity, and criterion-related 
validity.  See Table 2 for sample means and standard deviations.  
Social Responsiveness Scale, Second Edition (SRS-2; Constantino & Gruber, 2012).  
The SRS-2 is a parent-reported measure that assesses the severity of social difficulties in children 
aged two-and-a-half to adulthood.  The school-age form is designed for parents of children aged 
4-18 and was included in the current study only for the ASD group as a measure of autism 
severity.  The SRS-2, which was recently released from Western Psychological Services in 
October 2012, is an updated version of the commonly used Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS; 
Constantino & Gruber, 2005), which was designed to help distinguish children with autism 
spectrum disorder from those with other clinical diagnoses.  The sensitivity, or the ability to 
accurately identify a diagnosis of ASD, of the SRS was reported to be .85, and the specificity, or 
the ability to exclude those without ASD, was reported to be .75.  Additionally, internal 
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consistency of the SRS was reported to be .91-.97, the test-retest reliability was .84-.97, inter-
rater reliability was .76-.95, and convergent validity was reported to be .35-.58 when compared 
with the ADOS and ADI-R (Constantino & Gruber, 2005).   
Given that the SRS-2 was recently released in October 2012 and limited research has 
been conducted using this measure, reliability analyses were conducted on the sample of children 
with ASD using coefficient alpha in order to assess the consistency of scores within each of the 
five treatment subscales.  When interpreting the results, the greater the consistency of the items 
within subscales, the higher the coefficient alpha should be.  For the eight items that comprised 
the Social Awareness subscale, α = .75; for the 11 items that comprised the Social Cognition 
subscale, α = .82; for the 22 items that comprised the Social Communication subscale, α = .92; 
for the 11 items that comprised the Social Motivation subscale, α = .87; and for the 12 items that 
comprised the Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors subscale, α = .88.  These results indicate that 
there was high internal consistency for all of the treatment subscales, which is consistent with the 
data reported in the manual. 
The SRS-2 is available for use in clinical and research settings as a screening measure or 
as a way to assess the impact of a treatment over time.  It was normed on an ethnically diverse 
sample of 1,906 children.  The SRS-2 consists of 65 questions, and the scoring generates a total 
score and five treatment subscale scores: social awareness, social cognition, social 
communication, social motivation, and restricted interests and repetitive behavior.  Sample items 
from the SRS-2 include: “Is aware of what others are thinking or feeling,” “Shows unusual 
sensory interests or strange ways of playing with toys,” “Does not join group activities unless 
told to do so,” “Walks in between two people who are talking, and “Talks to people with an 
unusual tone of voice.” The total score and the social cognition score were used in analyses for 
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the current study.  The parent who brought the child to the testing session completed this 
questionnaire, which took approximately 15 minutes.  See Table 2 for sample means and 
standard deviations. 
Procedure 
Typically developing twins  
Three- and four-year-old testing.  At the beginning of each family's visit to the Play 
Lab at ages three and four, a trained graduate research assistant explained the purpose of the 
study, confidentiality, risks, and benefits to the parent(s) prior to obtaining consent.  A separate 
consent form was signed to give permission to collection buccal cells, which allowed for the 
ability to acquire genetic information from the twins.  The twins took turns being tested by a 
trained examiner in a separate room away from their co-twin, with each child’s testing session 
lasting about 10-15 minutes.  I was trained on and have tested twins at ages three and four; 
therefore, I am familiar with the administration of this protocol.  As part of the testing block, the 
children were administered two similar false belief tasks (outlined by Wellman & Liu, 2004) to 
measure ToM abilities (see Appendix A for the Theory of Mind Protocol at Ages 3 and 4).  After 
the twin testing sessions were completed, a 10-minute parent-child interaction was recorded from 
behind a one-way mirror without the presence of any lab members.  Three separate buccal cell 
collections occurred over the course of the testing block, once prior to each twin's testing session, 
and a third prior to the parent-child interaction.  Following completion of the testing session, the 
twins were each given gift bags and small presents (e.g., toy figures, books, activity coloring 
sets) as compensation for their participation.  All tasks completed on the day of testing were 
coded later by trained raters and double entered by two different research assistants.  Only the 
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data from the two ToM tasks from the test battery were used in the current study.  Detailed 
scoring procedures were outlined above. 
Follow-up study. As part of the current study, families of 6- to 10-year-old twins who 
completed the ToM tasks at ages three and/or four as part of SITSS (DiLalla, 2002a), as well as 
those families whose children participated at age five only, were contacted and asked to 
participate in this study.  The data from the children who participated in SITSS at age five but 
not age three or four were still used in the larger study.  These families were recruited and 
contacted through direct mailings and phone calls.  In addition to these families, eight new 
families were included whose children had not previously participated in SITSS.  A consenting 
procedure similar to the one used in the younger twin study was used in the current study to 
outline the purpose of the study, explain procedures used to maximize confidentiality, detail the 
risks and benefits of participation, and describe compensation.  All of the children whose 
families participated in testing sessions at age three and four already had buccal cells analyzed 
following their initial visit(s) to the lab.  Buccal cells were collected during the follow-up study 
from new children who were not previously part of SITSS.  Children were administered a one-
hour-long test battery, which comprised the five ToM measures, the receptive and expressive 
subtests of the CELF-4, as well as other measures to assess emotional development as part of a 
larger study.  Two trained testers (chosen each test session from five graduate students, including 
myself, and two advanced undergraduate students) tested the twins, one by one tester and the 
other by another tester in two separate rooms. 
Compensation.  Funds were available to compensate the twin families with $50 and a 
$10, age-appropriate toy after completion of the follow-up study, thanks to a grant obtained by 
Dr. Lisabeth DiLalla through SIU's School of Medicine.   
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Children with autism spectrum disorder  
Twenty-five boys with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) were recruited through the 
Center for Autism Spectrum Disorders (CASD) on campus, which was also where the testing 
took place.  All children whose parents agreed to their child’s participation underwent a 
consenting procedure, which outlined the purpose of the study, confidentiality, risks, benefits, 
and compensation, prior to administering the five ToM measures and the receptive and 
expressive subtests of the CELF-4.  This testing session took approximately 30 minutes, which 
included the five minutes needed to collect buccal cells, once at the beginning, once between the 
ToM tasks and the CELF-4 administration (using a counterbalanced order), and once after the 
testing protocol was completed.  It should be noted that there were only minor issues noted 
during testing with this sample (i.e., inattention requiring repetition of test questions), but 
otherwise the testing protocol appeared to be well-tolerated by the children with ASD.  In fact, 
many reported that they thought the ToM tasks were “fun” or “kinda like games.”  In addition, 
the parent who brought the child on the day of testing completed the Social Responsiveness 
Scale, Second Edition (SRS-2; Constantino & Gruber, 2012) and the CBCL (Achenbach & 
Rescorla, 2001), as well as a short demographic questionnaire which was used to generate an 
estimate of socioeconomic status for descriptive purposes.   
Compensation.  I was awarded a dissertation research grant offered by The Autism 
Program of Illinois (TAP) in the amount of $1000.  This award provided funding to process the 
genetic samples, to purchase the SRS-2 questionnaires, and to compensate the families who 
participated at the CASD.  I compensated these families with a $10 Walmart gift card and 
provided small toys (worth $5 each) to all children with ASD following completion of the 
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protocol.  This level of compensation was advised by a committee member familiar with this 
population as a reasonable compensation for the twin families from SITSS.   
Power Analysis 
An a priori power analysis was completed with G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & 
Lang, 2009) by including the projected minimum sample size of the current study (62 
participants), given the available sample in the surrounding geographical area.  This analysis 
indicated that there would be sufficient power to detect a medium to large effect size.  This is 
consistent with past literature reporting significant differences with large effect sizes.  The 
conventional value for power used in psychological research to reject the null hypothesis is 80% 
(Cohen, 1992), with alpha set at .05.  
For hypotheses including bivariate correlations, I calculated that I would have 78% 
power to detect a large effect (ρ =.30), given a sample size of 62 participants.  For hypotheses 
requiring a χ2 test, I calculated that I would have 79% power to detect a large effect (w = .35) 
with a sample of 62 participants.  Lastly, for hypotheses using MANOVA, I calculated that I 
would have 84% power to detect a medium effect (f2 = .25), given a sample size of 62 
participants. 
For the single behavioral genetic analysis in Hypothesis 3a, G*Power 3 could not be used 
to estimate power unless the frequency of the single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) in a 
specific sample to be studied is known, which it was not.  Furthermore, Schmitz, Cherny, and 
Fulker (1998) indicated that 100 MZ and 100 DZ twins are typically required to detect 
significant genetic influence at the .50 level in behavioral genetic analyses.  The current study 
did not include 200 twins; therefore, results from this genetic analysis should be replicated in a 
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larger sample.  In sum, the current sample size would be sufficient to detect any medium to large 
relationship that existed for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3b. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
 None of the variables used in the analyses required correction for skewness or kurtosis 
because either: 1) the variables were dichotomous; or 2) the variables were standardized using T-
scores.  For Hypotheses 1 and 3, one randomly selected twin was chosen from each of the twin 
families for the analyses in order to avoid violating the independence of samples assumption.  In 
the analyses used in Hypothesis 2, one boy from each twin pair with at least one male was quasi-
randomly selected (i.e., Twin 1 from each pair was selected unless Twin 1 was female and then 
Twin 2 was selected), resulting in a sample of 62 boys (37 typically developing boys and all 25 
boys with ASD).  There was no difference between groups for age of boys.   
Group differences were significant for language ability such that typically developing 
twins outperformed children with ASD on receptive language, F(1, 67) = 35.63, p < .001, and 
expressive language, F(1, 67) = 42.89, p < .001.  In addition, there were significant group 
differences in SES when only maternal education, occupation, and income were included (there 
was missing data from fathers), F(1, 44) = 6.51, p = .014.  Because maternal education has been 
shown to be related to verbal ability in children, an ANCOVA was run to compare receptive 
language ability between groups after controlling for maternal education level and was 
significant, F(1, 37) = 17.96, p < .001.  Since the group differences appear to be largely driven 
by language differences rather than differences in maternal education, maternal SES was 
reported for descriptive purposes only, especially given the concern of low power, and was not 
controlled for in any of the subsequent analyses.  All typically developing twins were included in 
Hypothesis 3a for the behavioral genetics analyses (see Table 1 for total sample demographic 
information).   
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Development of Theory of Mind from Preschool to Middle Childhood 
Hypothesis 1 tested the understanding of social cognition in typically developing children 
over time.  Hypothesis 1a stated that the average ToM performance from ages 3 and 4 would 
predict performance at follow-up (i.e., one time between ages 6 to 10).  Hypothesis 1a was 
analyzed using Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients, specifically a nonparametric partial 
correlation controlling for age, given the varying ages at follow-up.  The variables included in 
the analyses were the two ToM scores (memory and contents) from ages 3 and 4 and all five 
ToM task scores at follow-up (see Table 3).  The memory scores at ages three and four were not 
correlated with performance on any of the five ToM tasks at follow-up (p > .05), with the 
exception that memory at age four was negatively correlated with the score on the real-apparent 
emotion task at follow-up, ρ(38) = -.33, p = .04.  The contents score at age three was not 
correlated with the performance on any of the five tasks at follow-up (p > .05), but the contents 
score at age 4 was negatively correlated with two of the follow-up ToM tasks, belief emotion and 
real-apparent emotion, p < .05.  Thus, ToM ability at age 4, especially performance on the 
contents question, appears to be more related to future ToM performance than performance at 
age 3. 
Hypothesis 1b stated that younger children in the follow-up sample would not pass as 
many of the five ToM measures as older children in the current study, thus generating a lower 
overall score.  Hypothesis 1b also was tested using Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients.  Age 
(in months), the five individual ToM scores, and the total ToM score were the variables used in 
this correlational analysis.  Results showed that age was only positively correlated with the total 
ToM score at follow-up for the combined sample, ρ(86) = .23, p = .03, but not any of the 
individual ToM tasks (p > .16).  However, when the groups were separated by diagnostic status, 
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age was positively correlated with performance on three out of the five tasks (contents false 
belief, ρ(61) = .33, p = .009, explicit false belief, ρ(61) = .40, p = .001, and real-apparent 
emotion, ρ(61) = .34, p = .007) in the typically developing sample.  Age was not correlated with 
performance on the belief emotion task, ρ(61) = .05, p = .70 or the understanding sarcasm task, 
ρ(61) = .21, p = .10.  There were no significant correlations between age and ToM task 
performance for any of the five ToM tasks (p > .25) for the children with ASD (see Table 4). 
Thus, it appears that chronological age is important for the development of advanced social 
cognition in typically developing children but not children with ASD.   
Group Differences in Social Cognitive Abilities 
Hypothesis 2 tested the group differences in ToM abilities of children with and without 
autism spectrum disorder.  Hypothesis 2a stated that children with ASD would not score as high 
as typically developing children on all five measures of ToM included in the current study given 
their widespread deficits in social cognitive abilities.  Only boys from the typically developing 
sample were included because all the children in the ASD sample were boys.  Specifically, group 
differences in ToM performance in Hypothesis 2a were tested using a series of Chi-square tests.  
Age was not controlled for because age was not significantly different between the diagnostic 
groups as shown in the preliminary analyses section.  This resulted in a subgroup of 62 boys: 25 
ASD boys and 37 boys from the twin sample who were quasi-randomly selected (Twin 1 from 
each twin pair was selected unless Twin 1 was female and then Twin 2 was selected).  Five 
separate Chi-square analyses were conducted using diagnostic status (i.e., typically developing or 
ASD) and the score from each of the five ToM tasks administered when boys were between the 
ages of 6 and 10.  Results indicated that typically developing children outperformed children 
with ASD on all five tasks. (see Table 5). 
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Developmental progression of ToM abilities   
Figure 1 shows the results of a profile plot of the group differences broken down by ToM 
task. Although the twins outperformed the children with ASD on all tasks, the order effects 
between groups were not significant, with the exception of the understanding sarcasm task.  
These data are in contrast to previously published research suggesting that children with ASD 
develop social cognitive abilities in a different order than typically developing children 
(Wellman et al., 2011). 
In addition, a reliability analysis was run in order to determine whether the performance 
on any of the five tasks was markedly different than any other.  The total ToM score had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .60, which is fair, and all of the inter-correlations between tasks were 
positive, ranging from .23-41.  Importantly, the alpha did not improve if any of the items were 
deleted, suggesting that these items are all conceptually related to the broader construct of social 
cognition.  However, the inter-correlations were low, which reflect the heterogeneous nature of 
this construct.  Thus, the use of the total ToM score was used in subsequent analyses as a way to 
increase variability.       
Language ability   
In order to assess group differences on language abilities, an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was used to compare groups on language ability after controlling for age.  It should 
be noted that the CELF-4 was not collected on the first 20 twin families because this measure 
was added after data collection began; therefore, the sample for this analysis is smaller than the 
sample used in the other analyses that do not include the CELF-4.  In addition, consistent with 
the other analyses investigating group differences, only boys were used in this analysis to 
minimize confounds.  Thus, the total N for the typically developing sample with CELF-4 data 
  
 
65
was 21.  Results showed that there was a significant group difference on CELF-4 language 
ability, F(1, 51) = 23.60, p < .001, η = .32, such that typically developing children had higher 
receptive language scaled scores compared to the children with ASD even after controlling for 
age (see Table 6). 
Theory of mind   
In order to test whether age and/or language ability better predicted total ToM score (i.e., 
the sum of the performance on all five of the tasks), a hierarchical regression was used.  CELF-4 
receptive language scores and age were included as the control variables in Step 1 and group was 
entered in Step 2 to predict overall ToM ability. During the first step (F(2, 45) = 35.42, p < .001, 
adjusted R2 = .61), receptive language (β = .88, p < .001) and age at follow-up (β = .43, p < .001) 
were significantly related to the total ToM score, such that children with better receptive 
language ability and older children scored higher on the ToM total score.  In the second step, 
diagnostic group was added to determine its effect after controlling for receptive language and 
age.  At this step (∆R2 = .03, p = .059), group (β = -.22, p = .059) was not predictive of ToM 
total score at follow-up after accounting for receptive language ability and age, (F(3, 45) = 
26.40, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .63) (see Table 7). 
Social and emotional functioning   
Social-communication problems and restricted and repetitive behaviors are core deficits 
in children with ASD, and emotional processing difficulties make navigating social situations 
even more difficult for these children.  Thus, hypothesis 2b stated that children with ASD would 
have significantly more difficulties on the CBCL scales related to social abilities (i.e., Social 
Problems, Thought Problems, Withdrawal) and emotional processing abilities (i.e., 
Anxious/Depressed) but not other CBCL problem scales (i.e., Aggression, Delinquency, 
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Somatization) compared with typically developing children.  It should be noted that the CBCL 
Thought Problems scale is believed to better measure unusual or odd behavior than thought 
processing difficulty.  In addition to these four CBCL subscales, Attention Problems was added 
as a dependent variable following data collection due to the behavioral observations obtained 
during the testing sessions indicating that several children with ASD struggled with inattention 
throughout the tasks.  Hypothesis 2b was analyzed using a MANCOVA, controlling for language 
differences, to test whether groups significantly differed on the hypothesized CBCL scales.  
Diagnostic status (typically developing or ASD) was used as the independent variable, receptive 
language score was used as the covariate, and scores on the CBCL scales were used as the 
dependent variables.  Results from the MANCOVA indicated that children with ASD were more 
impaired on the Thought Problems subscale, and trends in the hypothesized direction were noted 
in the Attention Problems and Anxious/Depressed subscales. There were no significant group 
differences on the Social Problems and Withdrawn/Depressed subscales (see Table 8).  
Autism severity and ToM performance   
Hypothesis 2c, which was analyzed only using children with ASD, stated that autism 
symptom severity, as measured by the treatment subscales on the SRS-2, would be negatively 
correlated with ToM abilities.  Hypothesis 2c was analyzed using Spearman’s rho correlation 
coefficients and included the scores on the five treatment subscales (i.e., social cognition, social 
communication, social awareness, motivation, and restricted/repetitive behaviors) and the scores 
on the five individual ToM items.  In addition, a bivariate correlation was conducted using the 
total SRS-2 score and the total ToM score as variables. 
Results from the nonparametric correlations (see Table 9) showed that lower scores on 
explicit false belief, ρ(25) = -.46, p = .021, and real-apparent emotion, ρ(25) = -.56, p = .006, 
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were associated with higher parent-rated social cognitive difficulties.  In addition, lower scores 
on the real-apparent emotion task were associated with higher parent-rated social communication 
difficulties, ρ(25) = -.52, p = .008, and restricted/repetitive behaviors, ρ(25) = -.44, p = .028.  
Given the nature of nonparametric tests, low statistical power may be influencing the ability to 
detect significant relationships between these variables.  Results from the bivariate correlation 
between total ToM score and Total SRS-2 score indicated that there is a negative relationship 
between these variables, r(25) = -.44, p = .028, suggesting that children with greater social 
impairments do not pass as many ToM tasks.  It should be noted that correlations between the 
SRS-2 treatment subscales and the understanding sarcasm task could not be computed due to the 
fact that none of the children with ASD in the current study passed this task. 
 An exploratory analysis examined the correlation between the CBCL scales that were 
hypothesized to be related to ASD behaviors (Anxious/Depressed, Attention Problems, Social 
Problems, Thought Problems, and Withdrawal) and scores on Social Cognition, one of the 
treatment subscales on the SRS-2 measuring parent-reported social cognitive abilities.  Results 
showed that there were strong correlations between the scores on the Social Cognition subscale 
from the SRS-2 and the Attention Problems (r = .62, p = .001), Social Problems (r = .59, p = 
.002), Thought Problems (r = .57, p = .003), and Withdrawal subscales (r = .60, p = .001) from 
the CBCL.  A non-significant correlation was found for the Anxious/Depressed subscale (p = 
.058). 
Genetic Effects on Social Cognition 
Hypothesis 3 tested whether broad heritability (h2) and different genotypes of the DRD4 
and 5-HTTLPR genes in particular would be related to performance on ToM tasks.  Hypothesis 
3a stated that there would be significant heritability for ToM task performance.  Specifically, 
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Hypothesis 3a analyzed heritability of ToM abilities by using intraclass correlations to correlate 
Twin 1’s preschool ToM performance with Twin 2’s preschool ToM performance, separately for 
MZ and DZ twins.  Similarly, Twin 1’s school-aged ToM score was correlated with Twin 2’s 
school-aged ToM score, for each ToM task administered at follow-up and separately for MZ and 
DZ twins.  Then, the intraclass correlations for each twin type were transformed into z-scores 
using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation method.  Next, t-tests were used to compare the z-scores for 
MZ and DZ twins to test whether they were significantly different from each other.  Finally, 
heritability was estimated using the following formula outlined by Falconer (1960):  
h2 = 2(rMZ - rDZ). 
Behavioral genetic hypotheses   
Results using Falconer’s estimates of heritability are reported in Table 10.  There were no 
significant heritability estimates; however, there were two heritability estimates that were 
significant at the p < .10 level: the school-age contents false belief and understanding sarcasm 
tasks.  In a few instances, the MZ correlation was negative (e.g., contents at age four); thus, the 
Falconer heritability estimate could not be computed, and the resulting heritability estimate was 
zero.  This pattern (DZ > MZ) suggests that the effect is driven by environmental factors rather 
than genetic factors.  For the contents false belief and the understanding sarcasm tasks at follow-
up, the correlation between MZ twins was more than two times greater than the correlation for 
DZ twins.  As a result, the MZ correlation is substituted for h2, and it is believed that dominant 
genetic effects are at play in this situation.  There was no evidence for heritability for the other 
ToM measures. 
Molecular genetic hypotheses   
Hypothesis 3b used three sets (one for each gene [5-HTTLPR and DRD4] and one using 
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both genes) of five Chi-square analyses -- 1) total sample; 2) twins only; 3) ASD only; 4) males 
only; and 5) females only -- to test whether children with risk alleles performed worse on ToM 
tasks compared to those without risk alleles.  One child was selected from each family to avoid 
violating the independence of sample statistical assumption.  A breakdown of the frequency of 
genotypes by diagnostic group can be seen in Table 11. Specifically, the first set of five Chi-
square analyses tested whether children with the S or LG allele (versus 2 copies of the LA allele) 
of the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism performed worse on ToM performance, analyzed for each ToM 
task separately (see Table 12).  The second set of five Chi-square analyses were conducted to test 
whether children with six or more repeats (versus both alleles with fewer than six) in the DRD4 
polymorphism performed worse on ToM performance, analyzed for each task separately (see 
Table 13).  Lastly, the third set of five Chi-square analyses tested whether children with at least 
one risk allele for both genes (5-HTTLPR and DRD4) performed worse than those who had at 
least one risk allele for one gene but not the other (5-HTTLPR or DRD4) who in turn would 
perform worse than those individuals with no risk alleles on each of the ToM tasks (see Table 
14).   
The genotypes were scored dichotomously for the first two sets of analyses (5-HTTLPR 
and DRD4), with a score of 0 indicating that there was no risk allele present and a score of 1 
indicating that there were 1 or 2 risk alleles present.  For the third analysis using both 5-HTTLPR 
and DRD4, the genotypes were scored trichotomously.  Specifically, children with at least one 
risk allele in both genes (i.e., 5-HTTLPR and DRD4) were coded with a 2, children with only 
one risk allele in one or the other gene (but not both) were coded with a 1, and children without 
any risk alleles were coded with a 0.  The task performance for all analyses was scored 
dichotomously such that a score of 0 indicated that the child failed the task and a score of 1 
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indicated that the child passed the task.  Each of the three main molecular genetic analyses was 
run five times using different samples: total sample (N = 86); all twins (N = 61); all children with 
ASD (N = 25); males only (N = 62); and females only (N = 33).  In addition, three ANOVAs 
were run to test for genetic effects on the total ToM score for each gene separately and for the 
triallelic combination of risk alleles using both 5-HTTLPR and DRD4 polymorphisms.  
Genotype data were unavailable for one of the male twins; however, all of the gene data were 
available for the remainder of the sample. 
5-HTTLPR polymorphism   
Significant results from the Chi-square analyses for the 5-HTTLPR genotype are reported 
in Table 12.  In the twin and female samples, there was a significant genotype effect for the 
contents false belief task.  In the male sample, there was a significant genotype effect for the 
belief emotion task; however, this did not survive Bonferroni correction.  There were no other 
significant genotype effects for the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism. 
Results from the ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference between those 
with and without 5-HTTLPR risk alleles on total ToM task performance, (see Table 15). 
DRD4 polymorphism   
Significant results from the Chi-square analyses for the DRD4 genotype are reported in 
Table 13.  In the total sample, there were no significant effects for any ToM task.  Analysis of 
the subsamples indicated that the genotype effects in the twin sample for the explicit false belief 
task and the belief emotion task were significant at the p < .10 level and in the hypothesized 
direction.  In the ASD and male only samples, there was a significant genotype effect for the 
contents false belief task.  There were no other significant genotype effects for the DRD4 
polymorphism. 
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Results from the ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference between those 
with and without DRD4 risk alleles on total ToM task performance (see Table 15). 
Triallelic combination of risk alleles from 5-HTTLPR and DRD4   
Significant results from the Chi-square analyses including both genes (5-HTTLPR and 
DRD4) are reported in Table 14.  In the total sample, there were no significant effects for any of 
the ToM tasks.  Analysis of the subsamples indicated that there was a significant genotype effect 
in the ASD sample for the contents false belief task.  There were no other significant effects for 
the triallelic combination. 
Lastly, the results from the ANOVA showed that there was no significant genotype effect 
between risk allele groups when using both genes on the total ToM score (Table 15).     
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
This study adds unique and important contributions to the growing literature on the 
psychological and genetic factors important for the development of social cognition in children 
with and without autism spectrum disorder.  The inclusion of children from a longitudinal study 
provided an opportunity to analyze the development of social cognitive abilities over time, and 
the inclusion of twins allowed for the examination of heritability of social cognition in this 
sample.  In the twin sample, age was related to ToM task performance; however, receptive 
language ability, not age, was strongly related to task performance in children with ASD.  
Analysis of group differences showed that children with ASD were markedly impaired on all 
ToM tasks compared with typically developing peers.  Furthermore, it appears that ToM abilities 
progress differentially based on group membership, and more advanced skills such as the 
understanding of non-literal language, or pragmatics, may not develop in children with ASD 
until after the age of 11.  Parents of children with ASD reported social, emotional, and 
behavioral difficulties on the CBCL in the hypothesized areas (i.e., social problems, thought 
problems, withdrawn/depressed, and attention problems), which suggests that the CBCL 
provides useful supporting information for clinicians who are assessing children with ASD.  In 
addition, the newly released SRS-2 appears to be a valid and useful measure of autism severity 
given its strong negative relation to ToM task performance and positive relation to social, 
emotional, and behavioral characteristics commonly seen in children with ASD. 
This study was one of the first of its kind to analyze genetic differences in children with 
and without autism spectrum disorder using both behavioral and molecular genetic approaches.  
Although the behavioral genetic analyses were limited due to small sample size, the findings 
suggest that some areas of social cognition are more influenced by genetic influences than are 
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other cognitive skills.  Moreover, molecular genetic analyses suggest that the more basic ability 
to understand that others have thoughts, beliefs, and mental states that are different than one’s 
own (as measured by the contents false belief task) may be influenced by the underlying 
biological pathways that regulate the production of serotonin and dopamine, two 
neurotransmitters that have been linked to social cognitive abilities in previous studies of animals 
and humans.   
Development of Theory of Mind from Preschool to Middle Childhood 
Despite expectations that performance on false belief tasks during preschool would be 
positively related to advanced ToM abilities during middle childhood, findings did not support 
this hypothesis.  In addition, the few significant results reported were in the opposite direction, 
with children who failed false belief tasks during preschool being more likely to pass the two 
emotion tasks during middle childhood.  When taking into account the order in which typically 
developing children progressed through the tasks (i.e., contents false belief > belief emotion > 
real-apparent emotion > explicit false belief > understanding sarcasm), it could be that children 
who did not pass the simplest task (contents false belief) at age 4 showed the most improvement 
by middle childhood on the next two tasks (belief emotion and real-apparent emotion) in the 
developmental progression.  Most research in this area has reported that children are largely able 
to pass this type of task between the ages of 5 and 6.  Therefore, another explanation for these 
results could be that children in the preschool sample who were tested shortly after their third 
and/or fourth birthdays may have not yet mastered the ability to pass false belief tasks given their 
young age.  Thus, it is possible that there was more variability in the youngest age groups (e.g., 
ages three and four) than during middle childhood, and more significant and positive correlations 
between preschool and school-age performance may have been found if children were tested 
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shortly after their fifth birthday instead of their third or fourth birthdays.  The finding that 
children who failed the contents false belief task at age 4 did better on the two tasks with an 
emotional component at follow-up suggests that ToM abilities develop in a non-linear pattern 
over time in typically developing children (Wellman & Liu, 2004; Wellman et al., 2011). 
As expected, chronological age was positively related to performance on ToM tasks in 
typically developing children, which suggests that children develop more advanced ToM abilities 
along with increased knowledge and higher-order reasoning abilities, skills also known to 
improve with age (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004).  However, age was not related to 
performance on the belief emotion and understanding sarcasm tasks in the twin sample.  Low 
power may have affected the ability to find significant results on the understanding sarcasm task, 
especially since only a small proportion (14.5%) of the typically developing children passed the 
understanding sarcasm task given its difficulty level for school-age children.   
In contrast, age was not related to any of the ToM tasks in the ASD sample.  One possible 
explanation is that other factors such as language abilities are responsible for progressive 
development of social cognition in children with ASD rather than age-related brain maturation. 
This finding is consistent with other studies assessing advanced ToM abilities in children with 
ASD that included a measure of receptive verbal abilities (Fisher, Happe, & Dunn, 2005; 
Peterson et al., 2012; Scheeren, Rosnay, Koot, & Begeer, 2013).  Studies investigating the 
development of advanced social cognitive abilities over time such as the current study are 
especially important because so much of the previous research on ToM abilities in children has 
focused on false belief tasks (Wellman et al., 2001).  Therefore, this study provides more 
information regarding ToM abilities in school-aged children when social demands begin to 
increase.   
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Group Differences in Social Cognitive Abilities 
As expected, and consistent with most (Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008; Brent, Rios, 
Happe, & Charman, 2004; Peterson et al., 2012; Sobel, Capps, & Gopnik, 2005; Wellman et al., 
2001), but not all (Scheeren et al., 2012) of the previous research in the area of advanced ToM 
abilities, children with ASD performed worse on all of the ToM tasks when compared with 
typically developing children.  This study included five advanced ToM tasks that were 
previously included in other studies for the sake of generalizability, including two tasks that 
included an emotional processing component.  The findings that children with ASD performed 
worse on all of the tasks provides support for social information processing theory, which states 
that difficulties in social competence are related to poor social skills and difficulty processing 
emotional information, and the ToM theory of ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2000), which states that all 
children with ASD have deficits in social cognitive abilities. 
Analysis of the order in which children progressed through the ToM tasks did not reveal 
a differential pattern based on group membership, with the exception of the sarcasm task.  As 
predicted, the typically developing children performed significantly better than children with 
ASD; however, there were no other detectable order effects based on type of task, except for the 
fact that both groups performed worse on the sarcasm task than predicted.  Further studies using 
these tasks are needed to better understand the developmental progression of social cognitive 
abilities in typically developing children and children with ASD. 
An interesting qualitative finding was noted during the data collection of the boys with 
ASD.  A moderate proportion of children (38.5%) who were completing the real-apparent 
emotion task (i.e., asking the child to state how the boy in the story looked on his face and how 
he felt inside) flipped over the stimulus sheet that showed a picture of a boy from behind, as if to 
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see how he looked on his face.  Although data on whether any of the twins performed this action 
was not collected, a retrospective report suggested that few, if any, of the children in the twin 
sample performed this action.  One possible explanation for this finding in the ASD population is 
that children with poor social skills often have difficulty processing emotional information such 
as facial expressions.  As such, these children are often taught in social skills groups to look at 
others’ faces as a way to infer others’ mental states.  This finding is consistent with a previous 
study by Baron-Cohen and Goodhart (1994) on “seeing leads to knowing.”  The authors 
postulated that children with ASD do better on tasks such as the real-apparent emotion task than 
false belief tasks because they have likely been “trained” to know what a person’s face looks like 
in certain situations (happy, sad, so-so).  Thus, a face is something that you can see to gather 
information unlike someone’s mind, an abstract concept, which cannot be seen.  However, this 
also suggests that these children lack abstract reasoning abilities given their lack of 
understanding of how pictures work, which is consistent with prior research showing that 
children with ASD are able to pass concept identification but not concept formation tasks 
(Minshew, Meyer, & Goldstein, 2002). 
For the children with ASD, the two false belief tasks were second and third (explicit and 
contents, respectively) in the developmental progression, the belief emotion task was fourth, and 
the understanding sarcasm task was the most difficult, with none of the children with ASD 
passing this task.  This differential pattern suggests that not only are children with ASD delayed 
in their ability to acquire social thinking abilities, but also the order in which these skills develop 
over time are different.  This finding is especially important to consider when designing and 
implementing social thinking curricula, especially if skills are taught using a stepwise approach.  
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In sum, the finding that the children with ASD performed worse on all five tasks of advanced 
ToM abilities is consistent with the ToM theory of ASD.  
When comparing groups, children with ASD performed significantly worse on measures 
of receptive and expressive language, a pattern that has been consistently shown in previous 
research in this area despite no differences in cognitive abilities (Abu-Akel, 2003; Lackner et al., 
2010; Ozonoff et al., 1991).  It should be noted that these differences were seen in this study 
despite the fact that the five advanced ToM tasks were chosen in part because they required 
limited language abilities and included pictures to supplement the oral instructions.  Most 
interesting, however, is that, after controlling for age and receptive language ability, the group 
differences on total ToM task performance were no longer significant.  This finding suggests that 
children with ASD should be given intensive receptive, expressive, and/or pragmatic language 
instruction before, or in conjunction with, interventions seeking to improve social thinking skills.  
Similarly, parent-reports of problem behaviors indicated that children with ASD had 
greater social, emotional, and behavioral challenges than typically developing peers.  Children 
with ASD were reported to have greater difficulties in specific areas related to a diagnosis of 
ASD that can negatively impact the ability to engage in successful social interactions with peers.  
Interestingly, the group differences in social problems were not significantly different despite a 
trend in the hypothesized direction.  This could be related to low power or the fact that the 
children with ASD in the current study were in regular education classrooms and, as such, did 
not exhibit as many of the aberrant social behaviors included on the CBCL.  Clinical elevations 
on the Thought Problems and Withdrawn/Depressed scales suggest that the items on these scales 
may better represent the social, emotional, and behavioral difficulties of higher functioning 
children with ASD who spend the majority of the day in regular education classrooms.  Due to 
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the limited scope of this study, teacher-reported problem behaviors were not included, but these 
data should be collected in future studies on this topic to determine whether similar patterns 
emerge.  
The SRS-2 was included in the current study as a measure of autism severity given the 
strong psychometric properties and clinical utility of the previous edition of the SRS.  It was 
hypothesized that the total score on the SRS-2, as well as the scores on the five treatment 
subscales on the SRS-2 (social awareness, social cognition, social communication, social 
motivation, and restricted and repetitive behaviors), would be negatively related to ToM task 
performance.  Although the sample was small, several strong correlations emerged when 
comparing parent-reported problem behaviors with advanced ToM abilities as measured by 
performance during laboratory tasks.  Performance on the social cognition subtest from the SRS-
2 was negatively related to performance on the explicit false belief and real-apparent emotion 
tasks.  Given that these tasks were the easiest two tasks for the children with ASD, this may 
indicate that parent-report of social cognitive ability is only useful for assessing lower-level 
abilities.  The limited significant findings within this subscale also might indicate that parents 
cannot predict their child’s thoughts based on their behaviors; therefore, self-report or direct 
observation may be more useful.  However, given the strong correlations between autism 
severity level and ToM task performance, the SRS-2 may be a useful tool for assessing social 
cognitive abilities through parent report when more time-intensive laboratory testing is not 
available.  Furthermore, given that the SRS-2 is new and, therefore, not well-studied, strong 
correlations of the treatment subscale scores and total score with ToM task performance enhance 
its validity.  Due to limited time and resources, this measure was only given to parents of 
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children with ASD.  In future studies, the SRS-2 should be completed by parents of typically 
developing children given that autism severity is measured dimensionally on the SRS-2.   
Genetic Effects on Social Cognition 
It was expected that ToM abilities would be heritable, with higher correlations between 
MZ twins compared with DZ twins, given some previous support for this pattern in the literature 
(Hughes & Cutting, 1999; Scourfield et al., 1999).  The heritability hypothesis was not fully 
supported in this study, which suggests that environmental factors may be more likely than 
genetic factors to influence the development of advanced ToM abilities (Hughes et al., 2005), or 
that the sample was too small to detect an effect.  There were some noteworthy trends in the 
hypothesized direction (contents false belief and understanding sarcasm) that were likely 
affected by power.  Therefore, it is possible that some of the advanced ToM abilities included in 
this study, specifically the easiest and most difficult tasks, may be more influenced by genetic 
factors than environmental factors at this age.  
However, the finding that environmental experiences may be accounting for more of the 
variation in social cognitive abilities in middle childhood may not be surprising.  Briley and 
Tucker-Drob (2013) recently published a meta-analysis of the heritability of cognitive 
development, which included data from 16 longitudinal twin and adoption studies.  Previous 
literature has shown that heritability is lower for general cognitive ability in early childhood and 
increases linearly with age (Plomin, 1999; Spinath, Ronald, Harlaar, Price, & Plomin, 2003).  
Specifically, the heritability for preschool-aged children is estimated to be 20–30%, rising to 
40% in middle childhood (9 years of age), 55% in adolescence, and increasing to about 66% 
during early adulthood.  Thus, it is likely that this pattern holds for social cognitive abilities as 
well.  Plomin & DeFries (1985) coined the terms “innovation” and “amplification” to help 
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describe the phenomenon that heritability of cognitive abilities increase with age.  Amplification, 
or the idea that early genetic factors related to the development of cognitive abilities may 
become more important later in the selection of environments, may account for the size of the 
heritability estimate seen in this study for the contents false belief task, the most basic ToM 
ability.  The findings from the meta-analysis by Briley and Tucker-Drob (2013) are consistent 
with the theory that the genetic influences that are present in early childhood are primarily novel, 
and they become amplified as children get older.  On the other hand, innovation, or the increase 
in heritability due to novel genetic factors not previously present or activated, may be 
influencing the trend noted for the understanding sarcasm task.  Mastering this task requires an 
understanding of non-literal language, which is a novel skill that begins to develop in middle 
childhood and adolescence.  Thus, according to the theory by Plomin and DeFries, the genes 
influencing the development of an understanding of sarcasm are being “turned on” for the first 
time.  Follow-up studies are needed to test this theory. 
For a few of the ToM tasks, the correlation for MZ twins was lower than the correlation 
of the scores on the same task for the DZ twins, which underscores the importance of 
environmental influences on behavior.  One possible explanation for this finding is that early 
environmental factors (e.g., prenatal environment) may affect brain development in such a way 
that the genetic similarities in MZ twins are overshadowed by environmental differences.  
Another possibility is that MZ twins may not be learning anything new from their genetically 
identical co-twin if they are sharing friends or participating in similar activities together.  DZ 
twins, on the other hand, who are genetically more like non-twin siblings, may be choosing 
different environments (e.g., peer groups or activities), thus exposing themselves to different 
attitudes, beliefs, and desires.  Previous studies of theory of mind in twins with and without other 
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siblings have shown that twins without other siblings perform worse than twins with at least one 
sibling and have comparable scores to only children without siblings (Cassidy, Fineberg, Brown, 
& Perkins, 2005).  In addition, performance was boosted when the sibling was older and of the 
opposite sex, which suggested that the more different the experiences of the older sibling are, the 
better the child’s performance on theory of mind tasks. 
It was expected that results from the molecular genetic analyses would show that children 
with risk alleles in either or both of the 5-HTTLPR and DRD4 genes would perform worse on 
ToM tasks than those without risk alleles based on previous findings (Lackner et al., 2010, 2012; 
Skuse & Gallagher, 2011).  Findings from the current study indicated that serotonin and 
dopamine risk alleles may not play an influential role in the developmental of advanced ToM 
abilities.  There were some limited significant findings, specifically related to performance on 
the contents false belief task in relation to the DRD4 polymorphism for children with ASD.  
Additionally, there were a few trends in the hypothesized direction such that individuals with 
risk alleles in either or both of the 5-HTTLPR or DRD4 polymorphisms performed worse than 
those with fewer or no risk alleles.  In general, the findings in the current study provide support 
for the idea that biological pathways involving dopamine in the brain are necessary for the 
understanding of advanced ToM abilities in boys and in children with ASD. This is consistent 
with the findings of Lackner and colleagues, who reported a link between DRD4 risk alleles and 
performance on theory of mind tasks in preschoolers (Lackner et al., 2010; Lackner et al., 2012).  
Future studies with larger sample sizes are needed to further investigate whether serotonin and 
dopamine are related to the development of higher-order cognitive processes such as advanced 
ToM abilities. 
 
  
 
82
Clinical Implications 
The field of social thinking has become increasingly more important given the dramatic 
rise in prevalence rates of ASD in recent years.  Despite the gravity of this problem, the number 
of evidence-based interventions used to treat difficulties in social cognition is not keeping up 
with the demand.  However, a few high-quality interventions have demonstrated a strong 
evidence base recently, including the Social Thinking curriculum (Winner, 2002) and the UCLA 
PEERS program (Laugeson, Frankel, Mogil, & Dillon, 2009).  The Social Thinking program 
attempts to teach high-functioning children with ASD social decision-making skills in vivo 
rather than through typical social skills groups.  A brief report measuring the effectiveness of the 
Social Thinking intervention examined the outcomes of six males with Asperger syndrome 
following the implementation of this approach, which occurred over the course of eight weeks 
(Crooke, Hendrix, & Rachman, 2008).  Findings indicated significant improvements across 
several areas assessed, including the integration of what one hears and sees others say and do, 
initiation of social overtures, and use of appropriate verbal responses, as well as decreases in 
inappropriate verbal and nonverbal responses. 
The other widely used evidence-based social skills intervention for children with ASD is 
the UCLA Program for the Education and Enrichment of Relational Skills (PEERS), which is a 
14-week program targeted for middle school and high school students who are interested in 
learning how to develop and maintain friendships.  Research has shown that this program is 
efficacious and long-lasting, as evidenced by improvements in social responsiveness, social 
communication, social cognition, cooperation, as well as decreases in restricted and repetitive 
behaviors in adolescents with ASD, as reported by teachers (Laugeson et al., 2009).  These 
effects persisted at a 14-week follow-up assessment (Laugeson, Frankel, Gantman, Dillon, & 
  
 
83
Mogil, 2012).  Modifications to current social skills curricula and future interventions should 
incorporate developmentally sensitive research findings related to social cognition such as the 
findings from the current study in order to maximize benefits for children who participate in 
them. 
However, interventions such as these may not be sufficient for symptom reduction.  
Given the findings from this and other related studies on advanced cognitive abilities in children 
with ASD, more rigorous assessment and treatment may be required for optimal gains.  
Specifically, more advanced tools, such as genotyping, as well as a thorough speech and 
language evaluation, may help determine the level of vulnerability with which each child is 
presenting prior to beginning an intervention. Studies on monogenic disorders, such as Fragile X 
disorder, the most common known genetic cause of autism, are helping to progress the field by 
increasing knowledge of how genetic variations may influence the development of human 
behaviors (Losh, Martin, Klusek, Hogan-Brown, & Sideris, 2012).  More detailed information 
related to an individual’s strengths (e.g., increased verbal skills) and weaknesses (e.g., presence 
of a risk allele) could be used to design tailored treatments with more targeted goals. 
Strengths and Limitations 
The current study has many important strengths that are noteworthy.  First, the inclusion 
of a longitudinal study of twins allowed for the ability to conduct longitudinal and behavioral 
genetic analyses within the same study.  Second, the sample included a high-functioning group 
of children with ASD in middle childhood, which is an important age for social development and 
one that has only recently begun to be investigated.  Lastly, the inclusion of a range of advanced 
ToM tasks that are low in verbal demands increases the likelihood that group differences are not 
confounded by differences in the ability to understand or complete the tasks.  
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Although the current study has many important strengths, it is not without limitations.  
First, the sample size was not large enough to conduct behavioral genetics analyses with 
sufficient power.  Additionally, the longitudinal analysis of ToM performance from preschool to 
school-age was also under-powered due to the low response rate of families over time.  
However, the current sample size was sufficient to detect moderate to large effects when 
analyzing group differences.   
Second, due to time and resource limitations, other cognitive measures such as 
intelligence tests, memory tests, and/or executive functioning measures were not given as a way 
to test and control for potential group differences in these areas and to illustrate the dissociation 
between cognition and social cognition.  However, previous studies have reported that, even after 
controlling for IQ and executive functioning abilities, children with ASD are still more impaired 
than their typically developing peers (Abu-Akel, 2003; Lackner et al., 2010).  Given the limited 
number of studies on advanced ToM abilities in high-functioning children with ASD, however, a 
brief cognitive screening and/or other neuropsychological measures (e.g., memory) should be 
included to further clarify the neurocognitive factors important for the development of social 
cognitive abilities.  Specifically, memory tests would be important to include in future studies of 
social cognitive abilities given that specific regions of the brain associated with memory overlap 
with the areas of the brain associated with four forms of self-projection: episodic memory, 
prospection, theory of mind, and navigation (Buckner & Carroll, 2007).  The authors suggested 
that in order to successfully engage in social interactions, an individual must think about what 
might happen in the future (prospection), remember their own past behaviors, take the 
perspective of others, and then navigate, or “find their way” through a social interaction.  Thus, 
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from a cognitive psychology perspective, ToM is believed to be a type of self-projection that 
relies on remembering what happened in the past in order to plan future behavior. 
Third, the parents of typically developing children were not asked to complete the SRS-2 
due to time and resource limitations despite the fact that data from this measure would have been 
useful in further analyzing group differences, as well as providing data to support the validity of 
the SRS-2.  Fourth, it is possible that differences in the length of the testing protocols for each 
group could have confounded the results.  However, this is very unlikely given that the children 
with ASD consistently performed worse on ToM and language tasks despite the reduced time 
required to complete their testing compared to the twins.  Moreover, considering that the children 
with ASD in this study were chosen because they spent much of their day in the regular 
education classrooms, it also is unlikely that differences in the length of the testing battery of this 
magnitude would have affected their performance dramatically. 
Lastly, the age range of children included in this study limited the opportunity to analyze 
performance on the understanding sarcasm task in both groups given its level of difficulty for 
school-age children.  Moreover, a previous study by Ozonoff et al. (1991) reported that children 
with high-functioning ASD were able to pass more advanced ToM tasks by adolescence; 
however, the upper end of the age range in this study was pre-adolescence, which precluded the 
ability to test this relationship.  Thus, these tasks should be administered to an older sample of 
children with and without ASD in future studies in order to determine the approximate age at 
which children develop an understanding of non-literal language such as sarcasm or irony. 
Future Directions 
The current study used explicit/direct tasks to measure advanced ToM abilities.  
However, future studies should include implicit/indirect tasks in addition to explicit tasks as a 
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way to eliminate language demands given the difficulties in receptive and expressive language in 
many children with ASD.  Although typically used with infants and younger children, implicit 
tasks have the benefit of being less cognitively demanding, which would allow for the analysis of 
more fine-grained differences in social cognitive abilities once language and cognitive demands 
have been minimized (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).  In addition, researchers including both 
implicit and explicit tasks would have the opportunity to compare the performance on these two 
tasks to each other as a way to see if they are truly measuring the same broader construct of 
social cognition.  If they are related, the findings from the studies of younger children using 
implicit tasks would have more support, and interventions for young children could begin earlier 
once abnormalities in the development of social cognitive abilities are identified. 
 This study included five advanced ToM tasks that were selected because they tapped 
related but unique aspects of social cognition and required limited language demands on the part 
of the examinee.  Previous studies on this topic, albeit limited, have used a surprisingly large 
number of different types of tasks to measure the construct of social cognition including strange 
stories, vignettes, pictures, and silent films.  Future studies should incorporate as many of the 
non-redundant tasks related to social cognition as possible to explore the factor structure of the 
construct of social cognition using factor analytic techniques.  The factors identified in such a 
psychometric study should be used in future studies on this topic.  
Lastly, given that children with ASD were able to pass the real-apparent emotion task 
more easily than any other task and nearly 50% of the time, future studies should include a more 
advanced emotion such as surprise to increase the difficulty level of the task for both children 
with ASD and typically developing peers. 
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Conclusion 
The ability for children to integrate information about others’ perspectives, emotional 
states, and behaviors is essential during successful social interactions with peers.  Findings from 
the current study suggest that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have more difficulty 
completing tasks that require them to take another’s perspective than do typically developing 
peers.  Neurobiological and genetic factors may be influencing the observed group differences, 
including the delayed onset of skill development, as well as the differential order in which these 
skills emerge.  Furthermore, age is a crucial factor in the development of more advanced social 
cognitive abilities in typically developing children, whereas verbal ability appears to be an 
influential factor in children with ASD.  Analysis of the development of these skills over time 
provides useful information for both groups about how and when to intervene when children are 
exhibiting social difficulties in middle childhood.  Thus, this study provides support for the fact 
that implementing developmentally appropriate early interventions may be the most promising 
way to improve the quality of social interactions in typically and atypically developing children.  
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Table 1 
Sample Demographic Information 
 
Note. SES: socioeconomic status; Language ability was measured using the Clinical Evaluation 
of Language Fundamentals, 4th Edition (CELF-4). 
a Group differences were significant for receptive and expressive language abilities (ps < .001) 
but not for age and SES (ps > .05).  
  Twins (N= 127) ASD (N = 25) 
 N M SD Range M SD Range 
Age 62 8.07 1.56 6-11 8.69 1.29 6-11 
SES 62 8.21 1.68 4-11 7.68 2.18 4-10 
Language Ability          
     Receptive 43 10.99a 2.31 3-17 6.46 4.21 1-13 
     Expressive 43 11.34a   2.53 5-16 6.23 3.79 1-13 
Intellectual Ability        
     Verbal IQ  9 -- -- -- 86.56 6.25 77-96 
     Non-verbal IQ  12 -- -- -- 96.92 15.93 63-112 
     FSIQ  10 -- -- -- 90.00 9.50 70-107 
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Table 2 
 Means and Standard Deviations for Parent-Reported Problem Behaviors 
a Child Behavior Checklist, Parent-report; T-score < 60 = Within normal limits; 60-69 = Borderline; >70 = Clinical. 
Group differences exist for all subscales of CBCL listed above; b Social Responsiveness Scale-2, Parent-report; 
Subscales: Social Cognition, Social Awareness, Social Communication, Motivation, Restricted/Repetitive 
Behaviors; T-score < 59 = Within normal limits; T-score: 60-65 = Mild range, mild to moderate social impairment, 
T-score: 66-75 = Moderate range, clinically significant impairment, T-score > 76 = Severe range, consistent with 
Autistic Disorder.  
 
Twins (n = 62) ASD (n =25) 
 CBCLa M SD Range M SD Range 
Attention 52.85 6.57 50-78 64.84 12.36 51-100 
Social 52.73 5.05 50-73 58.80 8.34 50-85 
Thought 53.72 6.38 50-73 64.12 10.05 50-83 
Anxious/Depressed 53.68 6.34 50-75 57.80 8.95 50-78 
Withdrawal  52.17 4.20 50-73 59.84 8.80 50-79 
 SRS-2b       
Social Cog  -- -- -- 67.00 12.25 42-90 
Social Aware -- -- -- 67.31 12.41 42-90 
Social Comm -- -- -- 68.15 12.97 45-90 
Motivation -- -- -- 63.23 12.65 46-90 
RRBs -- -- -- 71.12 13.19 48-90 
SRS-2 Total Score -- -- -- 69.65 12.50 46-90 
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Table 3 
Partial Nonparametric Correlations Controlling for Age for Preschool and School-Age ToM 
+ p = .069, * p < .05 
 
 
 
  
 
School-age ToM Task 
Memory  
Age 3 
(n =33) 
Memory  
Age 4 
(n =38) 
Contents  
Age 3 
(n = 33) 
Contents  
Age 4 
(n = 38) 
Contents False Belief -.24 .01 -.12 -.09 
Explicit False Belief .13 .26 .23 .29+ 
Belief Emotion -.03 -.16 .23 -.31* 
Real-Apparent Emotion .18 -.33* .27 -.37* 
Understanding Sarcasm -.08 .17 .22 -.22 
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Table 4 
 
Partial Nonparametric Correlations between Age and Performance on ToM Tasks 
 
 Age in months 
 Twins 
N = 62 
ASD 
N = 25 
Total Sample 
N = 86 
 
ToM 1 .33** .06 .15 
ToM 2  .40** -.22 .11 
ToM 3 .05 .24 -.00 
ToM 4 .34** -.13 .14 
ToM 5 .21+ -- .14 
Total ToM .51** -.02 .23* 
Note. ToM 1: Contents false belief; ToM 2: Explicit false belief; ToM 3: Belief emotion; ToM 4: 
Real-apparent emotion; ToM 5: Understanding sarcasm.  None of the children with ASD passed 
the understanding sarcasm task; therefore, a correlation could not be computed. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .001. 
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Table 5 
 Chi-square Analyses for Group by ToM Task Performance (N = 62) with Males Only.  
5a.  Contents False Belief 
5b.  Explicit False Belief  
 Fail Pass Total 
Twin 6 (16%) 31 (84%) 37 
ASD 14 (56%) 11 (44%) 25 
Total 20 (32%) 42 (68%) 62 
5c.  Belief Emotion  
 Fail Pass Total 
Twin 5 (14%) 32 (86%) 37 
ASD 16 (64%) 9 (36%) 25 
Total 21 (34%) 41 (66%) 62 
5d.  Real-Apparent Emotion  
 Fail Pass Total 
Twin 6 (16%) 31 (84%) 37 
ASD 13 (52%) 12 (48%) 25 
Total 19 (31%) 43 (69%) 62 
5e.  Understanding Sarcasm  
 Fail Pass Total 
Twin 28 (76%) 9 (24%) 37 
ASD 25 (100%) 0 (0%) 25 
Total 53 (85%) 9 (15%) 62 
 Fail Pass Total 
Twin 6 (16%) 31 (84%) 37 
ASD 15 (60%) 10 (40%) 25 
Total 21 (34%) 41 (66%) 62 
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Group x Contents false belief task was significant, Χ2 (1, N = 62) = 12.77, p < .001.  
Group x Explicit false belief task was significant, Χ2 (1, N = 62) = 10.81, p = .001.  
Group x Belief emotion task, Χ2 (1, N = 62) = 16.98, p < .001.  
Group x Real-apparent emotion task, Χ2 (1, N = 62) = 8.99, p = .003.  
Group x Understanding sarcasm task, Χ2 (1, N = 62) = 7.11, p = .008. 
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Table 6 
Group Differences on Receptive Language Functioning After Controlling for Age (Males Only) 
 
 Twins (N = 29) ASD (N = 25)   
 M (SD) M (SD) F p 
Receptive Lang 11.24 (1.64) 6.56 (4.26) 23.60 < .001 
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Table 7 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Total ToM Score from Language Ability, Age, and 
Diagnostic Group (N = 46) 
 Total ToM Score at Follow-Up 
Predictor B SE B β ∆R2 
Step 1 
    Receptive Lang 
    Age 
 
.34 
.04 
 
.04 
.01 
 
.88*** 
.43*** 
.62*** 
 
 
Step 2 
    Diagnostic Group 
 
-.66 
 
.34 
 
-.22+ 
.03+ 
Note. For diagnostic group classification purposes 0 = Twin, 1 = ASD. 
Full model: F(3, 45) = 26.40, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .63. 
+ p = .059, *** p < .001. 
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Table 8 
MANCOVA Results for Groups Differences on CBCL Subscales for Males Only 
 Twins 
(n = 37) 
ASD 
(n = 25) 
   
CBCL Subscale M (SD) M (SD) F p η2 
   Anxious/Depressed 54.41 (6.46) 57.80 (8.95) 3.80 .057 .048 
   Attention Problems 54.14 (6.79) 64.84 (12.36) 3.76 .058 .243 
   Social Problems 55.57 (6.88) 58.80 (8.34) .49 .487 .044 
   Thought Problems 54.70 (5.46) 64.12 (10.05) 6.58  .013 .274 
   Withdrawn/Depressed 53.89 (5.29) 59.84 (8.80) 2.41  .126 .156 
 
  
 
97
Table 9 
Nonparametric Correlations Between ToM Task Performance and Parent-Rated Problem 
Behaviors 
 Parent-Rated Problem Behaviors 
 Social 
Awareness 
Social 
Cognition 
Social 
Comm 
Motivation RRBs 
ToM Task      
Contents False Belief -.31 -.12 -.28 -.15 -.05 
Explicit False Belief -.34+ -.46* -.34+ -.20 -.26 
Belief Emotion -.24 -.26 -.18 .01 -.35+ 
Real-Apparent Emotion -.38+ -.54** -.52** -.30 -.44* 
Understanding Sarcasm a -- -- -- -- -- 
Note. Social Comm = Social Communication; RRBs = Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors. 
a
 None of the children with ASD passed the understanding sarcasm task; therefore, correlations 
could not be computed. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Table 10 
Falconer’s Estimates of Heritability for ToM scores 
Variable rMZ 
N = 12 
rDZ 
N = 28 
h2 z 
Preschool Scores:     
Contents Age 3 .32 .21 .22 .31 
Contents Age 4 -.34 .11 0 -1.20 
Memory Age 3 -.24 .11 0 -.91 
Memory Age 4 .47* .07 .47 1.13 
School-age scores: N = 18 N = 47   
Contents False Belief .46* .08 .46 1.40+ 
Explicit False Belief .29 .46*** 0 -.67 
Belief Emotion -.21 .06 0 -.91 
Real-Apparent Emotion .23 .12 .22 .38 
Understanding Sarcasm .38* -.02 .38 1.41+ 
Note. h2 = 2(rMZ - rDZ).  If rMZ is greater than 2 times larger than rDZ, h2 = rMZ. 
+ p = .08, * p < .05, ** p = .001  
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Table 11   
Frequency of Genotypes by Diagnostic Group 
Genotype  Twins (N = 37) ASD (N = 25) 
5HTTLPR Risk Allele 12 (32%) 21 (84%) 
5HTTLPR No Risk Allele 25 (68%) 4 (16%) 
DRD4 Risk Allele 12 (32%) 8 (32%) 
DRD4 No Risk Allele 22 (59%) 17 (68%) 
Risk Allele in Both Genes 11 (30%) 8 (32%) 
Risk Allele in Only One Gene 16 (43%) 13 (52%) 
No Risk Allele in Either Gene 9 (24%) 4 (16%) 
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Table 12   
Chi-square Analyses of 5-HTTLPR Risk Alleles by ToM Performance.  
12a.  Contents False Belief (Twin sample; N = 61) 
 
12b.  Belief Emotion (ASD sample; N = 25) 
 Fail Pass Total Χ2 p 
No Risk Allele 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 4 3.14 .076 
1 or 2 Risk Alleles 15 (71%) 6 (29%) 21   
Total 16 (64%) 9 (36%) 25   
 
 12c.  Contents False Belief (Females only; N =33) 
 
12d.  Belief Emotion (Male only sample; N = 62) 
 Fail Pass Total Χ2 p 
No Risk Allele 2 (10%) 19 (90%) 21 4.40 .036 
1 or 2 Risk Alleles 14 (34%) 27 (66%) 41   
Total 16 (26%) 46 (74%) 62   
 
 
 
 
  
 Fail Pass Total Χ2 p 
No Risk Allele 7 (58.3%) 5 (41.7%) 12 5.15 .023 
1 or 2 Risk Alleles 12 (24.5%) 37 (75.5%) 49   
Total 19 (31.1%) 42 (68.9%) 61   
 Fail Pass Total Χ2 p 
No Risk Allele 5 (71%) 2 (29%) 7 5.80 .016 
1 or 2 Risk Alleles 6 (23%) 20 (77%) 26   
Total 11 (33%) 22 (67%) 33   
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Table 13   
 
Chi-square Analyses of DRD4 Risk Alleles by ToM Performance.  
13a.  DRD4 Risk Allele by Explicit False Belief  (Twin sample; N = 61) 
 Fail Pass Total Χ2 p 
No Risk Allele 4 (33%) 8 (67%) 12 3.04 .081 
1 or 2 Risk Alleles 30 (61%) 19 (39%) 49   
Total 34 (56%) 27 (44%) 61   
 
13b.  DRD4 Risk Allele by Belief Emotion (Twin sample; N = 61) 
 Fail Pass Total Χ2 p 
No Risk Allele 3 (30%) 7 (70%) 10 3.21 .073 
1 or 2 Risk Alleles 31 (61%) 20 (39%) 51   
Total 34 (56%) 27 (44%) 61   
 
13c.  DRD4 Risk Allele by Contents False Belief (ASD sample; N = 25) 
 
13d.  DRD4 Risk Allele by Contents False Belief (Males only; N = 61) 
  
 Fail Pass Total Χ2 p 
No Risk Allele 10 (48%) 11 (52%) 21 3.70 .055 
1 or 2 Risk Alleles 29 (73%) 11 (27%) 40   
Total 39 (64%) 22 (46%) 61   
 Fail Pass Total Χ2 p 
No Risk Allele 7 (41%) 10 (59%) 17 7.84 .005 
1 or 2 Risk Alleles 8 (100%) 0 (0%) 8   
Total 15 (60%) 10 (40%) 25   
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Table 14 
   
Chi-square Analyses of Trichotomous Risk Alleles by ToM Performance.  
14a. Trichotomous Risk Alleles by Contents False Belief (ASD sample; N =25) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Fail Pass Total Χ2 p 
No Risk Allele 2 (50%) 2 (50%) 4 8.01 .018 
1 or 2 Risk Alleles in Either Gene 5 (38%) 8 (62%) 13   
1 or 2 Risk Alleles in Both Genes 8 (100%) 0 (0%) 8   
Total 15 (60%) 10 (40%) 25   
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Table 15 
 
ANOVA Results for Genotype on ToM Performance (N = 86)  
  
 ToM Performance 
Gene F p 
5-HTTLPR .79 .376 
DRD4 .40 .529 
5-HTTLPR & DRD4 .59 .557 
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Figure 1. Profile analysis of group differences in task performance.  
Note: Task 1: Contents false belief; Task 2: Explicit false belief; Task 3: Belief-emotion; Task 4: 
Real-apparent emotion; and Task 5: Understanding sarcasm. 
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Appendix A 
Demographic Information Sheet 
 
Date________________ ID Number__________ 
 
Age of Children_______ DOB_______________ 
 
Your relationship to the children (Mother or Father; please note if adoptive 
parent):________________ 
 
Your Age:__________ 
 
Marital Status: 
Single, never married______ Married_____ Divorced/Separated_____ 
Widowed_____ Living with a significant other_____ 
 
Approximate Total Family Income: 
_____ Less than $5,000 _____ $20,000-25,000 _____ $40,000-45,000 
_____ $5,000-10,000     _____ $25,000-30,000 _____ $45,000-50,000 
_____ $10,000-15,000   _____ $30,000-35,000 _____ $50,000-55,000 
_____ $15,000-20,000   _____ $35,000-40,000 _____ Over $55,000 
Race of Child’s Parents: Mother__________ Father__________ 
Race of Children in Study: __________ 
 
 Occupation 
 
Finished 
High School? 
 
Attended 
College? 
 
Years of 
College 
(undergraduate 
& graduate) 
 
College 
Degrees 
(AA, BA, etc.) 
 
Self  Yes 
No 
If yes, please 
continue 
-->  
Yes 
No 
If yes, please 
continue 
--> 
  
Spouse or 
Significant 
Other IF 
living in 
home with 
children 
 Yes 
No 
If yes, please 
continue 
--> 
Yes 
No 
If yes, please 
continue 
--> 
  
Siblings of Children in the Study 
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Please start the list with the OLDEST sibling and move to the YOUNGEST. 
(Please do not include the children in the study) 
 
 First Sibling 
 
Second 
Sibling 
 
Third Sibling 
 
Fourth 
Sibling 
 
Fifth Sibling 
 
Birth Date 
 
     
Circle any 
that may 
apply 
 
Half-sibling 
Step-sibling 
Adopted 
 
Half-sibling 
Step-sibling 
Adopted 
 
Half-sibling 
Step-sibling 
Adopted 
 
Half-sibling 
Step-sibling 
Adopted 
 
Half-sibling 
Step-sibling 
Adopted 
 
 
Please list everyone in your household and their relation (e.g., father, grandmother, etc.) to the 
children in the study. (First names only, example: Ben – grandfather) 
 
We are interested in whether changes in the family, such as divorce or remarriage, affect your 
children’s behaviors. Therefore, the following item will help us to understand when these things 
may have happened in your family and how they may influence your children. 
 
If applicable, please indicate if you have ever been divorced or remarried and the year this 
occurred. 
 
Not applicable_____   Divorced_______   Remarried________ 
     Year________  Year________   
    Year__________  Year________ 
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Appendix B 
Theory of Mind Protocol (Age 3 and 4 Testing) 
 
 
Theory of Mind I (Playdoh container filled with crayons): 
Show the child the box and say: “What do you think is in this Playdoh container?”  Then 
show the child the contents of the box.  “What are these?” (Name the items if the child does not 
know or gives an incorrect response), then say: “When I first showed you this Playdoh 
container before I opened it, what did you think was in it?” Let the child respond, and then 
say: “If I show this container to (name of child’s twin or brother/sister), what would s/he 
say is in it?” 
 
Theory of Mind II (Crayon box filled with blocks): 
Show the child the box and say: “What do you think is in this crayon box?”  Then show the 
child the contents of the box.  “What are these?” (Name the items if the child does not know or 
gives an incorrect response), then say: “When I first showed you this crayon box before I 
opened it, what did you think was in it?” Let the child respond, and then say: “If I show this 
box to (name of child’s twin or brother/sister), what would s/he say is in it?” 
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Appendix C 
Theory of Mind Protocol (Current Study) 
Task 1: Contents False Belief 
 Tester shows child a clearly identifiable Playdoh container filled with crayons inside the 
closed container and says, “Here’s a Playdoh container. What do you think is inside this 
Playdoh container?” The Playdoh container is then opened: “Let’s see…it’s really Q-tips 
inside!” The container is closed and the tester then asks, “Okay, what is in the Playdoh 
container?” 
 Next, a toy figure of a boy is produced, and the tester says, “Peter has never ever seen 
inside this Playdoh container.  Now here comes Peter.  So, what does Peter think is in the 
box? Playdoh or Q-tips? Did Peter see inside this box? If I were to ask (name of co-twin or 
a familiar peer at school) what was inside this container, what would s/he say?” 
Task 2: Explicit False Belief 
 The child is shown a toy figure of a boy and a sheet of paper with a backpack and a closet 
drawn on it. “Here’s Scott. Scott wants to find his mittens. His mittens might be in his 
backpack or they might be in the closet. Really, Scott’s mittens are in his backpack. But 
Scott thinks his mittens are in the closet.” 
 The tester then asks the child, “So, where will Scott look for his mittens? In his 
backpack or in the closet? Where are Scott’s mittens really? In his backpack or in the 
closet?” 
Task 3: Belief-Emotion 
 The child is shown a toy figure of a boy and a clearly identifiable individual-size 
Cheerios box with rocks inside the closed box. “Here is a Cheerios box, and here is Teddy. 
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The tester pretends to be Teddy and says, “Teddy says, ‘Oh good, because I love Cheerios. 
Cheerios are my favorite snack. Now I’ll go play.” The tester then puts Teddy out of view of 
the child. 
 Next, the tester opens the Cheerios box, and the contents are shown to the child: “Let’s 
see…there are really rocks inside and no Cheerios! There’s nothing but rocks.” The 
Cheerios box is closed, and the tester says, “Okay, what is Teddy’s favorite snack?” 
 The tester brings Teddy back out, and the tester says, “Teddy has never ever seen inside 
this box. Now here comes Teddy. Teddy’s back, and it’s snack time. Let’s give Teddy this 
box. So, how does Teddy feel when he gets this box? Happy or sad?” The tester opens the 
Cheerios box and lets the toy figure look inside and says, “How does Teddy feel after he looks 
inside the box? Happy or sad?” 
Task 4: Real-Apparent Emotion 
 A child is shown a sheet of paper with three faces drawn on it—a happy, a neutral, and a 
sad face—to check that the child knows these emotional expressions. Then that paper is put 
aside, and the task begins with the child being shown a cardboard cutout figure of a boy drawn 
from the back so that the boy’s facial expression cannot be seen. The tester then says, “This 
story is about a boy. I’m going to ask you about how to boy really feels inside and how he 
looks on his face. He might really feel one way inside but look a different way on his face.  
Or, he might really feel the same way inside as he looks on his face. I want you to tell me 
how he really feels inside and how he looks on his face.” 
 Then, the tester reads the following story: “This story is about Matt. Matt’s friends 
were playing together and telling jokes. One of the older children, Rosie, told a mean joke 
about Matt and everyone laughed. Everyone thought it was very funny, but not Matt. But, 
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Matt didn’t want the other children to see how he felt about the joke, because they would 
call him a baby. So, Matt tried to hide how he felt.” The tester then asks the following 
questions: “What did the other children do when Rosie told a mean joke about Matt? In the 
story, what would the other children do if they knew how Matt felt?” 
 Next, the tester shows the child the emotion pictures and asks, “So, how did Matt really 
feel when everyone laughed? Did he feel happy, sad, or so-so? How did Matt try to look on 
his face when everyone laughed? Did he look happy, sad, or so-so?” 
Task 5: Understanding Sarcasm 
 The tester shows the child a colored line drawing of the back of a boy’s and a girl’s head, 
raindrops, and a wet cake and other food on a picnic blanket. 
 Next, the tester reads the following story to the child without any special intonation or 
emphasis: “The girl and boy are going on a picnic. It is the boy’s idea. He says it will be a 
lovely sunny day. But when they get the food out, big storm clouds come. It rains and the 
food gets all wet. The girl says: ‘It’s a lovely day for a picnic.’” 
 The tester asks the child the following questions: “Is it true, what the girl said? Why 
did the girl say ‘It’s a lovely day for a picnic?’ Was the girl happy about the rain?” 
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